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ABSTRACT 
 
SURVIVING THE WAR: AMERICAN ASSISTANCE TO THE JEWISH COMMUNITY 
OF PALESTINE, 1914 – 1917 
Duru, Nur 
M.A., Department of History 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Edward P. Kohn 
January 2013 
 
 During the nineteenth century, in hope of finding a solution to the eternal 
“Jewish Question”, a movement that envisioned a Jewish homeland in Ottoman 
Palestine took root among European Jewry. The Ottoman Empire had no intention of 
harboring another nationalist movement within its territories and thus took measures 
to prevent the colonization of Palestine. However, Jewish immigrants made use of 
the capitulations, which provided foreigners with extraterritorial privileges, to curb 
Ottoman measures and go forward with immigration into Palestine. With the 
outbreak of World War I, the Ottomans abolished the capitulatory system and left the 
movement without the capitulations which was vital for the continuation of 
immigration. Additionally the difficulties of the war created unfavorable conditions 
for the Jewish community of Palestine. The disruption of the traditional way of life, 
accompanied by the difficulties of war rendered the future of the community 
iv 
 
questionable. At this point, the United States of America took on the duty of 
protecting and assisting the community. This thesis attempts to deal with how the 
United States assisted the community from the beginning of the war up till the 
rupture of Ottoman-American relations in 1917. How the United States helped the 
community and through what channels, will be explained. 
Keywords: Jewish immigration, Zionism, American Zionism, Morgenthau, Palestine, 
Ottoman Palestine, Capitulations. 
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ÖZET 
 
FİLİSTİN’DEKİ YAHUDİ TOPLUMUNA AMERİKAN YARDIMI, 1914 – 1917 
Duru, Nur 
Yüksek Lisans, Tarih Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Edward P. Kohn 
Ocak 2013 
 
 On dokuzuncu yüzyılda, daimi olan “Yahudi Sorunu”na çözüm bulmak 
umuduyla, Osmanlı hâkimiyetindeki Filistin’de bir Yahudi yurdu öngören bir 
hareket, Avrupa Yahudileri arasında kök salmıştır. Yeni bir milliyetçi akımı 
bünyesinde barındırma niyetinde olmayan Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Filistin’in 
kolonizasyonunu önlemek için gerekli olan tedbirleri almıştır. Fakat Yahudi 
göçmenler, yabancılara verilen imtiyazlardan oluşan kapitülasyonlar sayesinde, 
Osmanlı Hükümeti’nin aldığı önlemleri geçersiz kılarak Filistin’e göç etmeye devam 
etmişlerdir. Birinci Dünya Savaşı’nın çıkmasıyla, Osmanlı Hükümeti kapitülasyonlar 
sistemini kaldırmış ve bu hareketi, göç için hayati önem taşıyan kapitülasyonlardan 
mahrum bırakmıştır. Ek olarak savaş, Filistin’deki Yahudi toplumunu zor koşullar 
içerisinde bırakmıştır. Alışagelmiş düzenin bozulması ve savaşın zorlukları, Yahudi 
toplumunun geleceğini tehlikeye düşürmüştür. Bu noktada, Amerika Birleşik 
Devletleri, Yahudi toplumuna yardım etme ve Yahudi toplumu koruma görevini 
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üstlenmiştir. Bu tez, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’nin savaşın başından Osmanlı-
Amerikan ilişkilerinin 1917 yılında kopmasına kadar olan süreçte, Yahudi toplumuna 
nasıl yardım ettiğini araştırmaktadır.  Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’nin, Yahudi 
toplumuna nasıl ve hangi kanallar aracılığıyla yardım ettiği ele alınmıştır. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Yahudi Göçü, Siyonizm, Amerikan Siyonist Hareketi, 
Morgenthau, Filistin, Osmanlı Hâkimiyetinde Filistin, Kapitülasyonlar. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 The failure of the Age of Enlightenment to generate a viable solution to the 
“Jewish Question” caused many European Jews in the nineteenth century to look for 
answers elsewhere. While some immigrated to the new world in search of salvation, 
others advocated assimilation into the societies they lived in. However, a significant 
portion sought a collective solution and in the spirit of the century turned to 
nationalism. They believed that their problems could be overcome only if the Jewish 
people became a nation with a homeland. This notion, which took root among 
European Jewry, stimulated the Zionist movement that would eventually lead to the 
creation of a Jewish state in the twentieth century. 
 As Jewish aspirations for a homeland burgeoned in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, the name Palestine was pronounced more and more in Jewish 
circles. In fact many Eastern European Jews, generally for religious reasons, had 
already begun settling in Palestine. Though other places were considered for a Jewish 
homeland, Palestine seemed to be the only place everyone agreed upon. So by the 
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First Zionist Congress held in 1897, it was declared that Zionism sought “to create 
for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law.”1 However, 
Palestine was not an empty land up for grabs; it was a part of the Ottoman Empire 
and was predominantly populated by Arabs. Taking this into account, Zionists 
initially strove to reach an understanding with the Sublime Porte in which a Jewish 
home in some form could be legally established in Palestine. Various proposals, 
including Theodor Herzl’s famous offer to alleviate the Empire’s debt with Jewish 
capital in return for a charter for the Jewish colonization of Palestine, were made 
only to be turned down. When the Porte made it clear that it was not willing to make 
such concessions; Zionists then resorted to colonizing Palestine in the hope of 
forming a community that would eventually obtain some sort of legal recognition in 
the future. As a result of this, the continuation of Jewish immigration into Palestine 
became crucial for the Zionist movement.  
 The Porte that was dealing with its own nationalist movements had no 
intention of allowing an additional one take root in its lands. Thus, the Ottomans 
objected to the Jewish colonization of Palestine right from the beginning and took 
measures to prevent its advancement. However, the capitulatory system, which 
provided extra-territorial rights and privileges for foreigners in the Empire, prevented 
the Porte from exercising sufficient measures. Furthermore, foreign powers that 
believed Zionist aspirations were harmonious with their own interests supported the 
movement unconditionally and pressured the Porte to rectify any Ottoman policy that 
sought to end or limit the Jewish colonization of Palestine.  
                                                     
1
 Itamar Rabinovich and Jehuda Reinharz, Israel in the Middle East: Documents and Readings on 
Society, Politics, and Foreign Relations, pre-1948 to the Present (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University 
Press, 1984), 21. 
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 Benefitting from the capitulations and the support of foreign powers, Jewish 
immigration into Palestine continued up till the outbreak of World War I. As the 
European powers were engaged in the war, the Ottomans seized the opportunity and 
abolished the capitulatory system in September, 1914 and shortly after joined the war 
on the side of the Central Powers. The abolition of the capitulations meant that the 
Ottomans could generate and implement policies without the drawback of 
capitulations. This however, meant uncertainty for the Jewish immigrants of 
Palestine for their future was now, solely in the hands of the Ottoman authorities. 
However, the lack of comfort the capitulations provided was not the only challenge 
that awaited them; with the Ottoman Empire joining the war on the side of the 
Central Powers, many Jewish immigrants faced exile or expulsion as they were 
nationals of belligerent powers. In addition, the diplomatic missions of belligerent 
powers were shut down, leaving many Jewish immigrants without the consular 
protection to which they were accustomed. The Jewish community of Palestine now 
had to deal with all these problems while bearing the hardships of the war which 
affected everyone in Palestine. Surrounded by such difficulties, the fate of the Jewish 
settlements were now in question. For the Zionist project to proceed, the settlements 
needed to outlive the war and as of October 1914 (the date the Ottoman Empire 
joined the war), it was unpredictable if they could. 
At this crucial point, the United States of America, via its diplomatic missions 
to the Empire, took on the task of assisting and protecting the Jewish community of 
Palestine. During the war the United States held friendly relations with the Porte; the 
United States’ approach to the Middle Eastern theatre and Ottoman concerns for the 
post-war years made it easy for both countries to enjoy cordial relations. The 
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Department of State and the American diplomatic agencies in the Empire engaged in 
a long battle of helping the Jews of Palestine endure many of the problems they 
encountered through the years of war. This thesis attempts to deal with just how the 
United States helped the Jewish community of Palestine survive the Great War. What 
the major problems the community encountered were and how the United States was 
able to deliver relief and mediate with Ottoman authorities in order to alleviate or 
end the community’s problems will be explained. 
Numerous books and articles have been written on Palestine during the Great 
War. The focus point for many of them is in relation to the Arab-Jewish conflict 
which emerged after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. As this thesis concentrates 
on the coming together of many elements (American, Jewish and Ottoman) at a 
certain point in time, studies concentrating strictly on the American assistance to the 
Jewish community in Ottoman Palestine during this time period are not plentiful. The 
most comprehensive work on the topic is The Realities of American-Palestine 
Relations, by historian Frank E. Manuel. This book covers American activity in 
Palestine starting from the beginning of modern Jewish immigration into Palestine, 
till the interwar period. The title of the book may be misleading; as the book focuses 
on American activity in relation with the Jewish community, not the general 
population. American involvement during the war is explained in detail. However, 
the Sublime Porte’s willingness to comply with American requests is often 
overlooked and any positive development stemming from Istanbul is attributed to 
Henry Morgenthau, the Central Powers, Ottoman Jews or the crypto-Jews within the 
Committee of Union and Progress. Manuel asserts that the Jewish community 
survived the war only because the Ottomans feared “reprisals from what they 
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considered powerful Jewish elements in the United States and throughout the rest of 
the world.”2 Without explaining why or providing further information, he leaves it at 
that. Manuel also claims that American intervention on behalf of Jewish 
communities abroad “annoyed” members of the Department of State.3 Nonetheless, it 
is the only work that examines the United States involvement with the Jewish 
community of Palestine so thoroughly. 
Melvin I. Urofsky’s American Zionism: From Herzl to the Holocaust, 
examines American Zionism from its birth. Its chapter covering the war period, 
explains how American Zionism transformed into a popular movement among 
American Jewry under the leadership of Louis D. Brandeis and how it organized 
relief efforts for Jews in war zones. The book indicates that the movement adopted 
policies in conformity with American foreign policy concerning Palestine, which was 
adopting neutrality regarding Middle Eastern affairs. While this allowed American 
Zionists to deliver relief to the Jewish community in Palestine during the war, it 
restrained them from supporting Zionist ventures in Europe. Urofsky explains that 
Brandeis had expected Woodrow Wilson to support the British plan to grant the 
Jewish people a homeland (which would later be known as the Balfour Declaration), 
“but not until every path toward a separate peace with Turkey had been explored.”4 
The State Department’s desire to avoid tension with the Porte is underlined as one of 
the aspects that hindered official endorsement of the Balfour Declaration. 
                                                     
2
 Frank E. Manuel, The Realities of American – Palestine Relations (Washington, D.C.; Public Affairs 
Press, 1949), 120. 
3
 Ibid, 112. 
4
 Melvin I. Urofsky, American Zionism: From Herzl to the Holocaust (Lincoln and London: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1975), 210. 
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The article “Ottoman Perspectives on American Interests in the Holy Land” 
which was co-written by Jacob M. Landau and Mim Kemal Öke is one of a kind in 
the field, as it is the only article under the chapter “The Ottoman Dimension” in With 
Eyes Toward Zion-II: Themes and Sources in the Archives of the United States, 
Great Britain, Turkey and Israel. The article remarks that towards the end of the 
nineteenth century the Ottoman government instructed its diplomats in the United 
States to “keep an eye on the growing Zionist movement.”5 It also provides 
information on what was reported back. The last part of the article entitled “Cemal 
Pasha and the Last Years of the Empire (1914-19)” focuses on Morgenthau’s efforts 
to reverse Cemal Paşa’s anti-Zionist measures through the Porte. The article argues 
that “during the war, the United States, because of its political and financial position, 
emerged as the only country (with the exception of Germany) able to exert any kind 
of pressure on the Porte.”6 How it was able to exert pressure is not explained in the 
article. 
Abigail Jacobson’s From Empire to Empire: Jerusalem Between Ottoman 
and British Rule which was published in 2011, dedicates a chapter to Jerusalem 
during the war. Alongside painting a vivid picture of how life in Jerusalem was 
during the war, Jacobson discusses American relief efforts and the distribution of 
relief among the various groups of Jerusalem. Jacobson argues that the Vulcan 
shipment “demonstrates the deep American involvement and investment in Palestine, 
                                                     
5
 Jacob M. Landau and Mim Kemal Öke, “Ottoman Perspectives on American Interests in the Holy 
Land”, With Eyes Toward Zion II: Themes and Sources in the Archives of United States, Great 
Britain, Turkey and Israel, edited by Moshe Davis (New York, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1986), 264. 
6
 Ibid, 277. 
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and mainly the influence of the Jewish American community, which collected and 
organized the aid.”7 
Historians are in agreement that the United States played a significant part in 
the survival of the Jewish community. However, how it did so has not been 
examined thoroughly. 
After explaining the Ottoman approach towards Jewish immigration into 
Palestine and the capitulatory system which had ensured the continuation of 
immigration, Ottoman-American relations will be examined. Ottoman-American 
relations during the war played a crucial role in the fate of the Jewish community of 
Palestine. After the Ottomans joined the war, the diplomatic agencies of the Allies, 
which had traditionally protected the Jewish residents of Palestine, were closed down 
in the Empire. In addition, Allied Powers could not appeal or pressure the Porte as 
they were accustomed to. The consulates of the United States and the Central Powers 
became the Jewish community’s protectors in Palestine, the United States and 
Germany in general. However, Germany’s relation with the community was 
restrained by the fact that it was the Ottoman Empire’s ally in the war. So the 
community’s faith was entrusted to the United States. It was only due to the good 
nature of Ottoman-American relations that the United States could assist and protect 
the community through the war. If relations had turned hostile at any point, the 
outcome for the community may have been different. Therefore, it is important to 
discuss the nature of Ottoman-American relations during the war and the factors that 
                                                     
7
 Abigail Jacobson, From Empire to Empire: Jerusalem Between Ottoman and British Rule (Syracuse, 
New York: Syracuse University Press, 2011), 47. 
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contributed to the execution of policies on both sides. This will be covered in the 
third chapter. 
After taking a look at the key figures that had a deep impact on the fate of the 
community; starting with the outbreak of war in Europe, the general conditions in 
Palestine and the major problems the Jewish community faced will be covered in 
chapter four. Then, American assistance and protection of the community will be 
discussed; how the United States assisted and protected the community, through 
what channels and the outcome of American involvement. The critical roles played 
by the American Embassy in Istanbul and the Department of State will be 
demonstrated, alongside how the United States benefitted from its good relations 
with the Sublime Porte.  
The primary sources used in this thesis are the United States’ diplomatic 
records with a focus on the consular records for Jerusalem covering the years of the 
war up till the rupture of relations between the Ottoman Empire and the United 
States in April, 1917. American newspapers and journals have also been used to 
portray a better understanding of the times. This work has been supplemented with 
Ottoman sources, alongside diaries and memoirs. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
JEWISH IMMIGRATION INTO OTTOMAN PALESTINE 
 
 
 Palestine had become a part of the Ottoman Empire in 1516 and remained so 
till 1917. It had joined the Empire at a time that, due to the discovery of an 
alternative trade route to India, the Mediterranean was leaving its prime days behind. 
Although the Ottoman Sultans had earned the right to add the name “governor of 
Jerusalem” to their title,8 Palestine was not a land that made a significant 
contribution to the revenues or to the military of the Empire.
9
 The importance of 
Palestine for the Empire was the holy sites that were sacred for Judaism, Christianity 
and Islam. Upon capturing Jerusalem, the Ottoman Sultan Selim entered the city and 
thanked God for becoming the “possessor of the first Qiblah (the direction of 
prayer).”10 The Sultans also took on the duty of safeguarding and assisting the 
pilgrims who visited the holy sites of Palestine on their way to and from Mecca and 
                                                     
8
 Jacob De Haas, History of Palestine: the Last Two Thousand Years (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1934), 330. 
9
 Moshe Ma’oz, Studies on Palestine During the Ottoman Period (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1975), 
xv. 
10
 Mehmet Tütüncü, Turkish Jerusalem (1516-1917): Ottoman Inscriptions from Jerusalem and Other 
Palestinian Cities (Harlem: SOTA, 2006), 13. 
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Medina.
11
 Palestine was a sacred yet remote Ottoman land and would stay so till 
European interests brought it back under the spotlight in the nineteenth century. 
 Palestine under Ottoman rule opened a new chapter for Jewish life in the 
land. The native Jews, who were dissatisfied with the Mamluk regime, hailed 
Palestine’s incorporation into the Ottoman Empire. They believed that the Empire, 
which was experiencing its golden age, would “open new vistas.”12 To their 
satisfaction, the Ottoman Sultans “allowed the Jews to move freely into the Holy 
Land and settle wherever they liked.”13 Thus new waves of Jewish immigrants, 
mainly Sephardic Jews who had sought refuge in the Empire after their expulsion 
from Spain, settled into Palestine. With a growing population and good relations with 
the Sultans, the Jewish community of Palestine advanced and prospered. 
 However, the Ottoman Empire reached the peak of its political power in the 
sixteenth century and entered a period of decentralization. The loss of territories in 
Europe and the rise of European imperialism accompanied by internal turmoil 
created unfavorable conditions for the Empire and its people. Corruption crept into 
all areas of the Empire; the government and society gradually “began to come 
apart.”14 The Jewish community in Palestine was also affected by the ongoing 
changes. No matter how the community’s relation with the central administration 
was, the fate of the community “became subject to the authority of the local pashas 
whose attitude varied according to temperament and personality.”15 The Jewish 
                                                     
11
 Ma’oz, Studies on Palestine During the Ottoman Period, xv. 
12
 Isaiah Friedman, Germany, Turkey and Zionism, 1897-1918 (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction 
Publishers, 1998), 21. 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Stanford J. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, vol. 1 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1976), 169. 
15
 Friedman, Germany, Turkey and Zionism, 23. 
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community also faced other challenges such as the decline of the Levant trade, 
natural disasters and communal tensions. The Jews of Palestine, sharing the fate of 
all the people of the Empire, had their good and bad days. 
 Modern Jewish immigration into Palestine which began in the late nineteenth 
century was fundamentally different from the previous Jewish immigrations as it was 
larger in number and it comprised of mainly Europeans, who kept their citizenship 
after immigrating to Palestine. The Sublime Porte was well aware of the groups of 
Jews turning up at its doors; its approach towards the phenomenon was complicated 
and versatile. The Ottoman Empire had traditionally been a haven for Jews fleeing 
European oppression so when anti-semitism escalated in the Russian Empire during 
the 1880s, the Ottomans welcomed Jewish immigrants, who were willing to become 
Ottoman citizens and submit to Ottoman laws, to settle within the Empire with the 
sole exception of Palestine.
16
 The exclusion of Palestine was unexpected and “hard to 
believe” for the Jews who were accustomed to Ottoman hospitality.17 The Porte 
which was up to date on Jewish affairs, via its diplomatic representatives, had valid 
reasons to adopt such a policy. Neville J. Mandel argues that the Porte, which was 
dealing with nationalist movements in the Balkans, “feared the possibility of 
nurturing another national problem in the Empire” and that “it did not want to 
increase the number of foreign subjects, particularly Europeans, in its domains.”18 As 
the Ottoman Minister of the Interior had explained, in addition to the Greek, 
Armenian, Serbian and Bulgarian problems, the Porte did not desire a “Jewish 
                                                     
16
 Neville J. Mandel, “Ottoman Policy and Restrictions on Jewish Settlement in Palestine: 1881 – 
1908: Part I” Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 10, no. 3 (Oct., 1974), 313; Kemal H. Karpat, “Jewish 
Population Movements in the Ottoman Empire, 1862-1914”, The Jews of the Ottoman Empire, edited 
by Avigdor Levy (Princeton: Darwin Press, 1994), 406. 
17
 Mandel, Ibid. 
18
 Ibid, 314. 
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Question.”19 However, the Porte’s decision did not have the desired effect as Jews 
continued to settle in Palestine after entering as visitors.
20
 Jewish circumvention of 
the Porte’s policies, forced the Ottomans to launch a bureaucratic battle that would 
go on to no avail.  
 As Jews continued to settle into Palestine after the Porte had prohibited it, the 
Porte had to find new ways to tackle Jewish immigration. Various measures, from 
forbidding Jews to disembark at Palestinian ports to closing down the Empire to all 
foreign Jews, were taken over time.
21
 However none of these measures proved 
fruitful as Jewish immigration into Palestine was not curtailed. The main reason 
behind the Porte’s failure was due to the capitulatory system, which will be 
explained. The Porte could not implement decisions that violated or limited the rights 
and privileges provided by the capitulations. Taking this into account, many Jewish 
immigrants took advantage of the capitulations to settle or remain settled in 
Palestine. Hence, the capitulatory system complicated an already complex situation. 
 
2.1. Capitulations 
 During its golden age, the Ottoman Empire had granted concessions which 
were generally commercial privileges in the form of business contracts to foreign 
states. These came to be known as capitulations. Alongside conforming to the 
prescriptions of fikh, there were other "determining factors" that instigated the 
Ottomans to pursue capitulations which Halil İnalcık explains as: 
                                                     
19
 Manuel, The Realities of American – Palestine Relations, 58. 
20
 Mim Kemal Öke, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Siyonizm ve Filistin Sorunu (1880 – 1914) (İstanbul: 
Üçdal Neşriyat, 1982), 84. 
21
 Mandel, “Ottoman Policy”, 322. 
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the opportunity of acquiring a political ally within Christendom, of 
obtaining scarce goods and raw materials such as cloth, tin and steel, and 
especially of increasing custom revenues, the principal source of hard 
cash for the Treasury.
22
 
 
Capitulations, which comprised of privileges for foreign individuals and 
communities, can be categorized under three main headings: personal, economic and 
juridical.
23
 Personal privileges included: freedom of worship, freedom to travel and 
reside in all parts of the Empire (the holy cities of Mecca and Medina were 
excluded), and inviolability of the domicile. Foreigners were also protected by the 
capitulations from possible molestation by Ottoman officials concerning religious 
affairs. Economic privileges, which constituted the backbone of the capitulations, 
were more significant in character. Foreigners under the capitulatory system were 
exempt from direct taxation and were also protected against arbitrary taxation. 
Import and export duties were regulated by the capitulations and no additional tax 
was required for the transfer of goods into the interior. The other group of privileges 
to be mentioned is the juridical privileges. According to the capitulations, 
ambassadors and consuls were invested with both civil and criminal jurisdiction in 
affairs regarding their nationals. In affairs between foreign nationals and Ottoman 
subjects however; Ottoman courts had jurisdiction, on the condition that a consular 
representative was present. To sum it up, the capitulations ensured for foreign 
merchants the comfort, if not more, of conducting business in the manner they were 
accustomed to in their own countries.   
                                                     
22
 Halil İnalcık, “Imtiyazat” in Encyclopaedia of Islam (Leiden: Brill, 1986), vol. 3, 1179. 
23
 Nasim Sousa, The Capitulatory Regime of Turkey: It’s History, Origin, and Nature (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1933) 
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 By the nineteenth century the capitulatory system had degenerated and 
digressed from its initial purpose. It had become an instrument for foreigners within 
the Empire to avoid Ottoman laws and for foreign states to meddle with the internal 
affairs of the Empire. There was also the fact that the capitulations had become a 
"fiscal burden" for the people of the Empire.
24
 The capitulatory powers prevented the 
Ottomans from raising their tariff rates and going further, forced the Ottomans to 
adopt regulations that were clearly detrimental for the Ottoman economy.
25
 During 
the final years of the Empire, foreigners had reached the point, in which they were 
exempt from paying for services most Ottoman subjects were charged.
26
 Juridical 
privileges were not any different; they were abused just as much. Though Ottoman 
courts held jurisdiction in cases between Ottoman subjects and foreigners, the courts 
were not always free in the decision-making process. Foreign powers insisted that 
decisions made without the consent of the consular dragoman were void and at times 
refused the courts jurisdiction all together. Capitulations had transferred into a 
mechanism that provided foreigners with more rights and privileges then they were 
entitled to in their own countries. 
 However, the abuse which became most problematic for the Sublime Porte 
was the extension of the capitulations to Ottoman subjects. This phenomenon 
occurred in various forms. Foreign diplomatic agencies in the Empire had started to 
incorporate Ottoman subjects, who were not in fact genuine interpreters, as 
dragomans into their agencies in order to extend to these Ottoman subjects the 
                                                     
24
 Timur Kuran, The Long Divergence: How Islamic Law Held Back the Middle East (Princeton, N.J. : 
Princeton University Press, 2011), 209. 
25
 Ibid, 213. 
26
 Ibid, 221. 
15 
 
capitulatory privileges and immunities to which dragomans were entitled. Another 
prevalent form of extending capitulatory privileges to Ottoman subjects arose in the 
eighteenth century; foreign powers had obtained the right to extend their capitulatory 
privileges to those who were not their own nationals.
27
 By the end of the eighteenth 
century, Austria had more than 200,000 protégés (protected persons) in just Moldova 
and at the beginning of the nineteenth century Russia had 120,000 Greek protégés 
within the Empire.
28
 In fact in some areas of the Empire, the number of protégés 
exceeded the number of Turks.
29
 The system was so abused that, capitulatory powers 
claimed protection over entire communities.
30
 Another popular method of extending 
capitulatory powers to Ottoman subjects was through naturalization; Ottoman 
subjects who became naturalized citizens of foreign countries could benefit from the 
capitulations. At one point the number of "naturalized" persons exceeded those of 
genuine foreigners.
31
  
 
2.2. The Capitulatory System and Jewish Immigration 
 The Ottomans who did not want another national problem on their hand, 
understandably, objected to Jewish colonization in Palestine. In a naïve attempt to 
halt masses of Jews entering Palestine, the Porte forbade Russian, Romanian and 
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Bulgarian Jews from landing in Jaffa and Haifa in 1882.
32
 They were instructed to 
enter the Empire from some other port. As this order was a clear violation of the 
capitulatory freedom to travel, the capitulatory powers objected. Going further, they 
obtained from the Porte, the right for Jews to settle in Palestine, as long as they 
arrived singly and not in groups.
33
 The Ottoman attempt to bring Jewish colonization 
to an end resulted with the Ottomans granting permission for Jews to settle in 
Palestine. 
 In another futile attempt in 1892, the Porte forbade the sale of miri (crown) 
lands to Jews.
34
 As they could not prevent the Jews from entering Palestine, the 
Ottomans sought to prevent Jewish colonization by denying them access to 
Palestinian lands. The restriction targeted both foreign and Ottoman Jews, as 
Ottoman Jews were buying land on behalf of foreign Jews. Similar to the previous 
restrictions, this was also a violation of the capitulations and thus embassies lost no 
time to appeal to the Porte. Succumbing to the pressure of foreign powers, the Porte 
had to back down and accept that foreign Jews could buy land as long as they were 
legal residents and did not plan on setting up colonies.
35
  
  The protégé system was the most troublesome aspect of the capitulatory 
system in Palestine. The British had assumed protection over the Protestants; the 
French over the Catholics; the Russians over the Orthodox and the Germans over the 
Templar Order. They would often compete with each other to increase their sphere of 
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influence. Foreign powers also shared the protection of Jews. As Jews immigrating 
into Palestine were not obtaining Ottoman citizenship, they contributed to this 
already intricate network. When Russia withdrew protection from its Jewish subjects 
in Palestine, they sought British protection rather than adopting Ottoman 
citizenship.
36
 This was possible as British diplomats extended their protection to 
“Jewish residents who had no birth, familial or legal connection to the United 
Kingdom.
37
  
 As mentioned before, the benefits provided by the capitulatory system were 
immense. However, the significance of the capitulations for foreign Jews in Palestine 
was the protection it provided against Ottoman authorities. In Palestine, capitulations 
provided foreign Jews protection from local authorities via consulates. Engin Akarlı, 
states that consuls had great influence in local matters: 
The consuls’ involvement in provincial matters significantly undermined 
the near-absolute authority of the governors. Consuls took the local 
disputes to the Ambassadors in Istanbul. The Ambassadors not only laid 
the individual incidents before the central government, but they also 
demanded regulation of the governors’ authority.38 
 
Similarly, Isaiah Friedman claims that “in most cases a warning from a consul had a 
sobering effect on the local authorities.”39 To underline how the capitulations 
operated in Palestine, Manuel explains an incident in which two American Jews had 
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argued with a tax-collector over real estate taxes.
40
 The American Consul intervened 
before the Governor of Jerusalem and the incident was resolved with the Governor 
paying the taxes out of his own pocket.
41
 This incident is a good example of how the 
capitulations were abused and where powerless local authorities stood in relation to 
foreign consuls. Further, the two foreigners managed to evade paying real estate tax, 
which was not waived by the capitulations. Regarding the situation of immovable 
property, David Kushner states that although “there was no legal distinction between 
Ottomans and foreigners, it was impossible to conclude transactions except through 
consuls.”42 Kushner also mentions an incident similar to that of Manuel’s in which 
the Governor of Jerusalem had captured two members of a gang which engaged in 
counterfeiting Ottoman coins. As they were American citizens, the American Consul 
objected to their trial before an Ottoman court and the matter was left unresolved. 
The Governor explained that he felt ashamed regarding how impotent Ottoman 
authorities were against foreigners.
43
 Consuls, who prevented their own citizens from 
appearing in Ottoman courts, had no problem demanding Ottoman citizens to appear 
as witnesses in their own consular courts.
44
 As it had elsewhere in the Empire, the 
capitulatory system had created a state within a state in Palestine. 
 Local matters were not the only area capitulations provided protection; they 
also provided protection from the central government’s policies that sought to 
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terminate Jewish immigration into Palestine. As long as Jews were under the 
protection of the Great Powers, the Porte was not free in dealing with foreign Jews. 
Even when foreign powers considered withdrawing their protection from the Jewish 
residents of Palestine, it was not an option as they were so entangled in the matter. 
Mim Kemal Öke asserts that “because they did not desire to forego the reservoir of 
power and influence they had established over the affairs of the Ottoman Empire, the 
Powers had no choice but, willingly or reluctantly, to become the promoters of 
Jewish colonization in Palestine.”45 
 Friedman put forward Ottoman objectives for Palestine in this period as 
making foreign Jews adopt Ottoman nationality and denying foreign powers the right 
of protection.
46
 The Ottomans did indeed push for Ottomanization and provided 
incentives. When over four hundred Russian Jews applied for Ottoman citizenship in 
1891, the Porte allowed them to stay in Haifa after their naturalization was 
completed.
47
 Similarly, local Ottoman authorities promised not to interfere with 
Jewish colonists in Safed if they became Ottoman citizens.
48
 However, the benefits 
provided by the capitulations outweighed those promised by the Ottomans and thus 
the majority of Jewish immigrants refused to adopt Ottoman nationality. Kemal H. 
Karpat claims that a large number of Russian Jews preferred to keep their citizenship 
simply to avoid taxes.
49
 Another factor that caused foreign Jews to remain distant to 
the thought of Ottomanization was the fear that it “would undermine the unique 
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character of the Jewish community, especially the status of the Hebrew language.”50 
For all the reasons stated above and more, Ottomans did not succeed in incorporating 
the Jewish immigrants in Palestine into the millet system. 
 Similarly, the Ottoman attempts to oust foreign involvement failed miserably. 
Although the Ottomans fought simultaneously, to abrogate the capitulations and 
convince foreign powers to end their protection over minorities in the Empire, their 
efforts produced no result. Aside from the desire to broaden their influence in the 
Empire, some foreign powers supported Jewish colonization in Palestine for genuine 
reasons. By supporting Zionism, Germany and Russia hoped of divert the attention 
of their own Jewish communities from socialism to Zionism; alongside finding an 
answer to their everlasting “Jewish Question.”51 For whatever reason, foreign 
support for the Zionist cause never ceased to exist. 
 When the Ottoman government made it clear that it was not going to assent to 
a Jewish state or political entity of any kind, Zionists turned their focus on colonizing 
Palestine. Masses of persecuted Jews left Europe in hope of reaching the promised 
lands. In fear of harboring another nationalist movement which would attract 
international attention, the Ottoman government objected to such mass immigration 
on its lands. However, the capitulatory system, which provided extra-territorial 
privileges for foreigners, prevented the Ottomans from carrying out policies as they 
desired. Furthermore, it provided Jewish colonists the opportunity to facilitate their 
colonization efforts. For the most part, they could avoid Ottoman authorities all 
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together. All Ottoman endeavors to curb the movement failed blatantly. The Jewish 
colonization continued slowly but firmly all the way till the First World War. After 
the war began in Europe, the Ottoman Empire notified capitulatory powers its final 
say on the capitulations: 
I have the honor to inform you that by the Imperial Iradé the Ottoman 
Government has abrogated as from the first of October next the 
conventions known as the Capitulations restricting the sovereignty of 
Turkey in her relations with certain Powers. All privileges and 
immunities accessory to these conventions or issuing therefore are 
equally repealed. Having thus freed itself from what was an intolerable 
obstacle to all progress in the Empire, the Imperial Government has 
adopted as basis of its relations with the other Powers the general 
principles of law.
52
 
 
Shortly after the Ottoman Empire joined the war and the Jewish community of 
Palestine was in the middle of war without the safety net provided by the 
capitulations. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
TRENDS IN OTTOMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS DURING THE WAR 
 
 
 Up till the Great War Ottoman-American relations were centered on trade and 
American missionary work in the Ottoman Empire. Shortly after the independence of 
the United States, trade between the two countries had started and expanded through 
the nineteenth century.
53
 As for missionary work, although American missionaries 
had attempted to reach the Muslim population, its main area of interest was the 
Christian population of the Empire.
54
 Unlike the European powers, the United States 
had no territorial ambition over the Empire; however, it had sought and obtained 
capitulatory privileges for its citizens. The United States was also interested in the 
general status of the Christian and Jewish communities. Former Ottoman subjects in 
the United States were influential in the shaping of American policies towards the 
Empire while American tourists and travelers to the Empire formed the basis of the 
American opinion regarding the Empire and its people. On the other hand, Ottoman 
interest towards the United States was limited. However, J.C. Hurewitz claims that 
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because of its non-aggressive diplomacy and its distance to the Eastern 
Mediterranean, the United States had a unique status before the Ottomans.
55
 
 Through the war, the United States kept a close eye on its interests in the 
Empire, as well as the situation of the Christian and Jewish communities. The United 
States appealed to the Porte whenever it believed its interests were at stake or when it 
deemed necessary on behalf of the Christian and Jewish communities of the Empire. 
For the most part, the Ottomans complied with American requests. Although 
Ottoman-American relations were minimal till the war, through the war it 
transformed in a unique manner. The Ottoman Empire and the United States shared 
friendly relations through the war and even when the United States joined the war on 
the side of the Allies it did not declare war on the Empire and so Ottoman-American 
relations were concluded with the fall of the Empire without experiencing any overt 
hostility.  
 When evaluating Ottoman-American relations during the Great War, there are 
some aspects that should be considered which contributed to the shaping of relations. 
There were many reasons for both countries to maintain cordial relations. For the 
Americans, the Middle Eastern theatre was not a primary concern and they feared 
that any unfriendly move on their behalf could have a negative effect on the non-
Muslim population of the Empire, alongside the American missionary societies in the 
Empire. On the other hand, the Ottomans considered maintaining good relations with 
the United States important for the future of the Empire. First the reasons that 
contributed to the formation of American policies towards the Empire will be 
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discussed and then the reasons that contributed to the formation of Ottoman policies 
towards the United States will be discussed. 
 
3.1. American Approach 
 Laurence Evans asserts that by the time the war broke out in Europe in 1914, 
the Middle East “was the most remote of the regions of the world with which the 
United States maintained diplomatic relations.”56 As the Middle East was not a 
matter of grave importance for the Americans, the United States maintained 
impartiality regarding the Middle Eastern theatre. When the Ottomans abrogated the 
capitulations, the United States refused to recognize it. However, when the British 
declared a protectorate over Egypt, which ended the de jure Ottoman sovereignty 
over Egypt, the United States also refused to recognize it.
57
 The fact that the Empire 
and its future was not of vital importance for the United States made it all the more 
easy for Washington to continue its traditional approach to the Porte. Nevertheless, 
when American interests were threatened, the United States stood firm. The greatest 
American interest in the Empire was the American missionary societies. The 
Secretary of State had explained the importance of the institution: 
It will be sufficient to say that during the past hundred years the 
American missionary societies have expended over $20,000,000 in 
Turkey, and that the present value of the American missionary 
property in Turkey amounts to several millions of dollars.
58
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Money was not the only investment that had been made: 
In the development of this work hundreds of educated American 
men and women have devoted the best years of their lives resulting 
in the building up of a strong American influence which still 
remains potent.
59
 
 
Thus when Henry Morgenthau, the American ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, 
was informed that the capitulations were going to be abrogated, to secure the status 
of American educational institutions within the Empire, he suggested to Enver Paşa 
that he visited Robert College the day the capitulations were abrogated. Morgenthau 
explains that such a visit would be significant as “the Turks would interpret it as 
meaning that one of the two most powerful men in Turkey had taken this and other 
American institutions under his patronage.”60 Indeed, Enver Paşa, who had assured 
Morgenthau that the Ottomans had no hostile intention towards Americans, 
corroborated his sentiment by visiting Robert College on the day of the abrogation of 
the capitulations.
61
 Similarly, Washington had a strong reaction to the abrogation of 
the capitulations, which caused the Ottoman consulate in New York to explain that 
even though the capitulations were abolished, Americans had no reason to be 
worried.
62
 He was right as Morgenthau stated that American educational institutions 
experienced no difficulty through the war.
63
 When the Secretary of State was making 
his case in front of the Committee of Foreign Relations of the Senate on why the 
United States should not declare war on the Ottoman Empire, he had stated that 
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American schools in the Empire continued “as in normal times with largely increased 
attendance.”64 The Americans expected affairs to continue as normal as it could 
during the war. 
 The situation of the non-Muslim communities of the Empire had a profound 
effect on American policies towards the Porte during this period. News regarding 
their treatment and possible treatment by Ottoman authorities was not uncommon in 
the American media. Such news intensified during the war. When the capitulations 
were abrogated, news regarding the disastrous outcome it could have on the non-
Muslim communities that were managed by American missionaries had started to 
generate.
65
 The Ottoman ambassador in the United States, Ahmet (Alfred) Rüstem 
Bey, was compelled to explain that the people of the Empire had no ill-intention but 
all the reference to such actions may cause the ignorant population to act in such a 
manner.
66
 American concern for the communities had started even before the 
Ottomans had joined the war and continued all the way till the end of the war. This 
reflected upon American policies in two ways. The first way was that the United 
States confronted the Porte regarding its treatment of non-Muslims, mainly 
Armenians. At times, the United States directly requested the Ottomans to protect the 
non-Muslim civilian population.
67
 While other times, it chose to remind the 
Ottomans that ill-treatment towards minorities was harmful to the relation between 
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the two countries.
68
 The United States did not hold back from transmitting Allied 
threats to hold the Ottoman Empire responsible for crimes against minorities either.
69
 
Acting upon American directions, Morgenthau made numerous appeals to the Porte 
regarding the situation of the Armenians.
70
 The United States and Morgenthau have 
been credited in the West for being outspoken regarding the situation of minorities in 
the Empire during the war. The United States also assisted minorities through the 
American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief. 
 The second way in which American concerns for the non-Muslim minorities 
of the Empire influenced American policies was a bit more complicated. In fear of 
giving the Ottomans any excuse that could lead to events ranging from the Ottomans 
refusing cooperation to maltreatment of non-Muslims; the United States was careful 
not to provide the Ottomans with such an excuse. Morgenthau had cautioned 
American Zionists that their actions could have consequences for the Jews in the 
Empire.
71
 Ironically it was his own statements claiming that the Ottomans were 
willing to sell Palestine that led the Ottomans to delay authorization for American 
citizens who were to leave the Empire on an American cruiser in late 1916.
72
 
Although minor slips occurred, Americans generally preferred to play it safe with the 
Ottomans. After the United States had joined the war and was discussing whether or 
not to declare war on the Ottoman Empire, the effect such a declaration may have on 
                                                     
68
 The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Morgenthau), 4 Oct, 1915, FRUS 1915, 
Supplement, 988. 
69
 The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State, 28 May, 1915, FRUS 1915, 
Supplement, 981. There is a footnote that indicates the dispatch was repeated to the ambassador in the 
Ottoman Empire. 
70
 FRUS 1915, Supplement, 979 – 990. 
71
 Urofsky, American Zionism: From Herzl to the Holocaust, 200. 
72
 The Ambassador in Turkey (Elkus) to the Secretary of State, 17 Nov, 1916, Papers Relating to the 
Foreign Relations of the United States: Lansing Papers (FRUS: Lansing) 1, 784 – 785. 
28 
 
Ottoman Christians was considered by the government. The Secretary of State 
asserted that a declaration of war “might cost the lives of many thousands of 
Christians in Turkey.”73 Whether or not American actions could have such grave 
impact on the non-Muslim population, the United States always considered the 
possibility of it in its relations with the Empire. 
 As the Ottoman Empire was not a point of focus for the United States, 
Washington preferred that relations continued in the usual manner as much as it 
possibly could. As long as American interests were intact, the main concern was the 
situation of the Christian and Jewish communities of the Empire. The Jewish sphere 
of American concern will be examined in the forth chapter. Overall the United States 
had limited objectives in its relations with the Ottoman Empire which enabled it to 
continue on reasonable terms. 
 
3.2. Ottoman Approach 
 As mentioned before the Ottomans opted to maintain cordial relations with 
the United States as it believed it was beneficial for Ottoman interests then and in the 
future. In order to understand why the Ottomans thought the United States could be a 
positive factor for the Empire, we must understand the reasons and under what 
circumstances the Ottomans entered the war and how the war failed to progress as 
expected. First, the Ottoman state of mind and what they expected from the war will 
be explained and then the driving forces that pushed the Ottomans to consider 
maintaining good relations with the United States to be beneficial for the Empire will 
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be explored. After that it will be demonstrated how the Ottomans went out of their 
way to maintain good relations with the United States.  
 
3.2.1. Ottoman State of Mind 
 On the eve of the war, the “sick man of Europe” had one thing on its mind; 
recovery. It was not a new phenomenon as the Ottomans had spent much of the 
nineteenth century trying to reform their institutions in order to adapt to what they 
perceived as a new world order. The Ottomans had failed as they could not revive 
their economy, prevent the loss of their territories or defy foreign powers that were 
lurking over the Empire. The decline of the Empire had continued as European 
encroachment had increased. When the Empire failed to pay off its debts in the 
1880s, which had accumulated to a great sum over the years, a council comprising of 
representatives of creditor nations was established. The council controlled over a 
quarter of Ottoman government revenues.  Similarly the capitulatory system, which 
was discussed in the previous chapter, had turned the Empire into a semi-colony. 
Loss of land was inevitable as communities within the Empire sought independence 
after ensuring the protection of one or more major European power. Even when the 
Ottomans won on the battlefield, European pressure could render it void. According 
to William Hale, the Empire “had apparently been locked in a no-win situation.”74 
However, all the hardships the Ottomans endured caused them to excel in exploiting 
the power struggles between the European states, which subsequently allowed the 
Empire to survive into the twentieth century. 
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 By the twentieth century, not much had changed for the Ottomans as the 
decline of the Empire continued. Although it seemed impossible, with the Balkan 
Wars (1912 – 1913), things had got worse for the Ottomans; during the war, the 
Empire lost most of its territory in Europe. Differing from previous defeats, it was 
not because of a major European power but at the hands of Balkan nations that were 
previously Ottoman subjects. Only by making use of the commotion among the 
Balkan states did the Ottomans succeed in recapturing Edirne in the second phase of 
the war. Nevertheless, the Balkan Wars had a tremendous effect on the Ottoman state 
and society. As the very existence of the Empire was threatened by the invading 
forces, who had reached the outskirts of the capital, disorientation and despair 
prevailed among all parts of society.
75
 Feroz Ahmad explains that during this period 
some political factions were convinced that “the Empire could survive only under 
Western tutelage” while others believed that “the Empire could be saved through a 
program of radical reform.”76 The second option was embraced by the leadership of 
the ruling party; Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). Not only did they 
contemplate reconstructing the state but also transforming the society. Of course, the 
leaders were well aware of the obstacles; with the gravest one being the 
capitulations, which stood in the way of such fundamental change. Alike the old 
regime, the Young Turks had approached European powers with the hope of 
abolishing the capitulatory system and alike their predecessors they were turned 
down. Thus CUP leaders believed the only way they could break free from the chains 
of foreign control that was holding the Empire back was by acquiring a strong ally. 
                                                     
75
 Feroz Ahmad, “War and Society under the Young Turks, 1908 – 18”, Review (Fernand Braudel 
Center), vol. 11, no. 2 (1988), 266. 
76
 Ibid. 
31 
 
The Ottomans made their first appeal to the British, only to be rejected. Next the 
Austrians turned down the Ottomans in February 1914, as did the Russians in May 
and the French in July.
77
 Then the Ottomans knocked on the door of Germany. 
Although Germany had adopted the policy of “peaceful penetration” into the Empire, 
it was the only Great Power that had never laid claim on any part of the Empire.
78
 
Enver Paşa, who had served as a military attaché in Berlin, openly explained his 
vision of reforming the Empire once it secured the protection of one of the Great 
Powers.
79
 He also emphasized that if Germany refused an alliance with the Ottoman 
Empire, the Ottomans would have no choice but to approach the Allies.
80
 In the 
shadow of the July crisis and after negotiations on August 2, 1914, the Ottomans 
managed to persuade Germany to sign an alliance with the Empire. Mustafa Aksakal 
claims that the Ottomans had seized an opportunity to “break out of the prolonged 
diplomatic isolation that had seemed like the mournful prelude to the empire’s 
dismemberment.”81 Cemal Paşa, who had advocated an alliance with France, was 
even accepting of the Ottoman–German alliance as he preferred “any alliance which 
rescued Turkey from her present position of isolation.”82 The Germans, who had 
reluctantly accepted an alliance with the Ottomans, immediately began to pressure 
the Ottomans to join the war once it broke out. The pressure mounted when two 
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German ships evaded the British fleet in the Mediterranean and continued on to 
Istanbul in early August. The Ottomans sought concessions from Germany in order 
to save the ships from the British and authorize their passage. Having no other 
choice, the Germans accepted to grant Ottoman demands, which included 
commitment not to conclude peace until all Ottoman territory was freed from 
occupation that may occur in the war, guarantee of any territorial gains on behalf of 
the Ottomans, incorporation of the ships into the Ottoman navy, and support for the 
abrogation of the capitulations.
83
 The Ottomans resisted German pressure to join the 
war for as long as they could and while they did, they also initialized their program 
to free themselves from the chains of foreign control. On 8 September, the Sublime 
Porte notified all embassies of the unilateral abrogation of the capitulations. Shortly 
after, the Porte raised customs duties, which had been determined by foreigners till 
this point, and closed all foreign post offices in the Empire. Succumbing to German 
pressure, the Ottoman Empire joined the war on 29 October, 1914. 
 The Ottomans perceived the Great War as an opportunity to turn around the 
fate of the Empire. For this purpose, their alliance with Germany could provide the 
conditions they had long hoped for. Aksakal asserts that: 
With the support and guidance of the German Empire, Ottoman 
leaders hoped to carry through the kind of radical transformation of 
the Ottoman state and its people necessary for the creation of a 
modern, sustainable state.
84
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However, the war did not provide the Ottomans with the opportunity to rejuvenate 
the Empire. On the contrary, it brought the Empire to an end. Of course Ottoman 
leaders could not have foreseen this during the war. After securing an alliance with a 
Great Power and initiating the process of freeing themselves from foreign control, all 
the Ottomans needed was a short lived war which resulted in the victory of the 
Central Powers. That was the prevalent feeling among the Ottoman leaders who had 
led their nation into war. 
 
3.2.2. The German Factor 
 The war was far from being the opportunity the Ottomans had waited for to 
actualize their plans. The hardship of the war accompanied by economic difficulties 
was disastrous for the Ottomans and the war did not seem like it would be a short 
one. Although the Ottomans envisioned a future free of foreign control, during the 
war they found themselves in the presence of another foreign power penetrating into 
the Empire: Germany. The Ottomans were aware of the nature of their alliance with 
Germany as Enver Paşa had explained that: 
If Germany supports Turkey materially and financially, it does so 
for its own advantage. If Turkey accepts [German aid] and thereby 
ties its fate to that of Germany, then it, too, does so exclusively to 
its own advantage. There can be no illusion about that.
 85
 
 
However, Germany’s military and economic influence over the Empire grew 
significantly with the alliance. Some scholars argue that Germany had long sought 
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control over the Empire and its resources and tried to achieve it during the war.
86
 
While other scholars claim that “German business interests made very little progress” 
during the war and that Germany was not successful “in harnessing the natural 
resources” of the Empire.87 Whatever the case may be, Ottoman statesmen were 
uncomfortable with the level of power Germany had acquired since the start of the 
war. Rıfat Paşa, the Ottoman ambassador in Paris had clearly stated his discomfort 
with the German infiltration in the Empire even before the Ottomans had joined the 
war: 
German interferences must promptly be brought to an 
end…Germany has no interest in saving us. She considers us a 
mere tool. In case of defeat she will use us as a means of satisfying 
the appetite of the victors; in case of victory she will turn us into a 
protectorate.
88
 
 
Through the war, Germany strengthened her position in the Empire.  Regarding the 
German influence in the army, an Ottoman officer explained that it seemed as if 
Ottoman soldiers had lost their control and independence in their own country.
89
 In a 
speech in June 1917, the American President Woodrow Wilson stated that: 
The Turkish armies, which Germans trained, are serving Germany, 
certainly not themselves, and the guns of German warships lying in 
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the harbour at Constantinople remind Turkish statesmen every day 
that they have no choice but to take their orders from Berlin.
90
 
 
Yusuf Hikmet Bayur asserts that during the war instead of assisting reform within the 
Empire, Germany had tried to replace the influence of the other Great Powers with 
that of its own.
91
 
 The Ottomans who had entered an alliance with the hope of finding an 
environment that would permit them to reform their state and society were bitterly 
disappointed with the turns of events during the war. Germany had gained a foothold 
in the Empire and attempted to consolidate its influence over the Empire. As the 
Ottomans had burned all bridges behind them by entering the war, if the Central 
Powers won the war, the Empire was left in the hands of Germany; if the Allies won 
the war, the Empire was left to their mercy. There was no scenario in which the 
Ottomans could actually “win.” Additionally, the human loss and economic 
breakdown within the Empire was beyond comprehension.
92
 For reconstruction, it 
was unlikely that the Ottomans could approach their traditional creditors as they had 
pursued an extended war against them. The Ottomans were forced to broaden their 
horizon regarding international relations. This was the setting in which Ottoman-
American relations progressed through the war. 
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3.2.3. The United States Enters the Picture  
 The Ottomans, much like the United States, had limited expectations from 
Ottoman-American relations during the war. As the Empire was going through a 
struggle over life and death on three continents, Ottoman leaders could not have had 
a well thought-over plan concerning what they expected from their relationship with 
the United States. Nevertheless there is strong evidence that the Ottomans pushed to 
maintain good relations with the United States. 
 Before the Empire joined the war, Ottomans had exhibited good will to the 
Americans concerning the problems stemming from the abrogation of the 
capitulations as covered before. On the status of American schools, the Grand Vizier, 
Sait Halim Paşa had expressed that: “We propose to give these institutions the status 
enjoyed by them in the United States, the management continuing to be 
independent.”93 When the Ottoman desire for absolute control over their own country 
is taken into account, allowing American schools to function as always, and even 
making public appearances there was against everything for which the Ottomans had 
aspired. Such inconsistency can be attributed to the facts that the Ottomans desired 
the continuation of good relations between the two countries, did not perceive the 
United States as an aggressive power, and there was no clear policy regarding the 
situation of foreigners once the capitulatory system was terminated. Hurewitz asserts 
that during the years of war, Americans and American institutions received better 
treatment in the Empire than that of the allies of the Ottomans.
94
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 The sale of arms to the Allies by the United States was a sensitive matter for 
the Central Powers. An article in an Istanbul newspaper had reported on American 
sales to the British Empire and France and stated Ottoman grievances regarding the 
matter.
95
 In his first interview in the American press, Enver Paşa had commented on 
the matter: 
Since the elimination of the capitulations this was the first situation in 
which the Turkish people might express resentment in a drastic way, but 
our people realize that this traffic in favor of a few manufacturers is not 
the fault of those Americans living here, and, therefore, our good old 
relations continue…The export of arms and ammunition from the United 
States to the entente powers can have but one result–useless killing.96 
 
Although the matter was of critical importance for the Ottomans, as American 
ammunition was being used by the Allies in Gallipoli, Enver Paşa, who was pro-
German, had refrained from saying anything negative towards the United States.
97
 
Feroz Ahmad states that the Ottomans “had hoped that the election of Charles Evan 
Hughes might provide a neutral administration that would prohibit sales of arms and 
ammunition to England.”98 However, in late 1916 Wilson was re-elected. 
 In April, 1916 the Porte had instructed provincial authorities to “avoid in all 
matters friction with Americans.”99 In case of dispute, authorities were instructed to 
“suspend all action” and refer the case to Istanbul to be settled between the Porte and 
the American embassy.
100
 The capitulatory system continued to exist de facto for 
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Americans. Ahmad claims that this was part of the Porte’s plan to avoid further 
dependency on Germany.
101
 By the end of the year, Talat Paşa had approached the 
American ambassador, Abram Elkus, regarding the possibility of an American loan, 
to which the ambassador responded positively.
102
 Although the venture was not 
pursued, the Ottomans continued to emphasize their expectation from the United 
States; Cavid Bey, the Minister of Finance, had told the American ambassador that 
for the post-war reconstruction of the Empire, their “only hope” was the United 
States.
103
 
 At the beginning of April 1917, the United States joined the war; however, it 
did not declare war on the Empire. Although the United States had pursued the 
continuation of relations, giving in to German pressure, the Ottoman Empire severed 
its relations on April 20, 1917. The Porte informed the American embassy that the 
rupture of diplomatic relations “was not a state of war and therefore that American 
citizens, as well as American institutions, should be treated exactly as before.”104 
Hostilities between the two nations never broke out and the United States continued 
to respect Ottoman territorial integrity till the end of the war. 
 It is not hard to understand why the Ottomans would want to maintain good 
relations with the United States. A declining Empire, with an enemy inside dictating 
its own policies forced the Ottomans to broaden their options on the international 
platform. The United States was a rising power and had no expansionist intention 
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over the Empire. By 1914, it was almost as if that was all the Ottomans needed to 
pursue friendly relations with a foreign power, not to mention that the Ottomans 
were aware of the United States’ rising status among world powers. Ottoman leaders 
feared for the post-war period and believed in investing in Ottoman-American 
relations during the war. Although the Ottomans did not have clear objectives 
regarding their relation with the United States, they made sure that it continued on a 
good path. 
 Overall, both countries had valid reasons to pursue cordial relations and the 
fact that both countries had limited interests for one another, enabled Ottoman-
American relations to continue in a friendly manner. How Americans benefitted from 
the good nature of Ottoman-American relations in favor of the Jewish community of 
Palestine during the war will be discussed in the next chapter.    
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CHAPTER IV 
 
THE JEWISH COMMUNITY OF PALESTINE DURING THE GREAT WAR 
AND AMERICAN ASSISTANCE 
 
 
4.1. Key Figures 
4.1.1. Henry Morgenthau 
Although it was a collective effort, there were key figures that without their 
contribution American assistance may not have been as significant. The name that 
that became synonymous with American support to the Jewish community of 
Palestine was Henry Morgenthau’s. He had reluctantly accepted ambassadorship to 
the Ottoman Empire as it seemed that it was the only diplomatic post a Jew could 
aspire for in the United States.
105
 However, he accepted the position as he was told 
by many, including President Woodrow Wilson, that he could do much for his co-
religionists in Istanbul and that was exactly what he did.
106
 Morgenthau shared good 
relations with the highest echelons in the Sublime Porte and more importantly he 
made use of the Porte’s high regards of the United States. After stepping down from 
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ambassadorship, he was appointed by the Department of State with the mission of 
concluding a separate peace with the Ottoman Empire. Morgenthau had explained to 
the Secretary of State Robert Lansing that he believed he could bring around the 
triumvirate ruling the Empire to make a separate peace with the Allies. Lansing 
conveyed Morgenthau’s message to Wilson who then approved of the mission.107 
The mission never did go through; but it demonstrated just how confident 
Morgenthau was in his dealings with the Porte. Even though Morgenthau was later 
on discredited and dispraised by Ottoman leaders;
108
 as it will be explained in this 
chapter, he was in fact an influential name during his time in Istanbul and had done 
much for the Jews of Palestine.  
The Jerusalem branch of the American Jewish Relief Committee had praised 
Morgenthau and his efforts on behalf of the community stating: 
When the present crisis began and the Jewish settlement was 
entirely cut off from those countries in Europe, with whom it was in 
close connection, and all sources of income were stopped, Mr. 
Morgenthau took the initiative steps in stirring up the charitable work of 
keeping the settlement afloat… 
Mr. Morgenthau appeared like a planet on our sky when darkness 
was over it, and he dug a path between the dark clouds above our heads 
to bring light thru our darkness. Therefore his name is blessed in our 
mouth, and his memory will remain engraved in the history of the 
settlement and will never disappear from our midst.
109
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The Committee was not exaggerating since Morgenthau never failed to provide 
assistance even if it was for a single person. When Cemal Paşa notified British 
national Annie Landau, who was the headmistress of the Evelina de Rothschild 
School, to either become an Ottoman citizen or leave Palestine; Morgenthau 
instructed Glazebrook to ask Cemal Paşa for the continuation of Landau’s present 
status as a “personal favor.”110 When Glazebrook conveyed Morgenthau’s request, 
Cemal Paşa turned him down and wished for no further effort to be made.111 
Morgenthau appealed in Istanbul to no avail as the government considered it “a local 
matter” and refused to interfere.112 He then contacted Claude Montefiore, the nephew 
of Moses Montefiore, to sort out the future status of Landau.
113
 All this diplomatic 
traffic could not prevent the departure of Landau as she left for Alexandria in May, 
1915; however, it is a clear indication of Morgenthau’s commitment to the 
community.
114
 His dedication was exceptional and ensured the safety, well-being, 
and above all the survival of the community through the war. 
 
4.1.2. Otis A. Glazebrook 
 The American Consul in Jerusalem, Otis Glazebrook, was another prominent 
figure who exhibited crucial support to the Jewish community. Glazebrook who was 
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a Pastor was said to always have a Bible on his desk.
115
 He was appointed to the post 
by his personal friend President Wilson.
116
 As the Department of State had made the 
Consulate in Jerusalem responsible for supervising the relief committees and 
distributing the provisions sent from the United States, Glazebrook presided over the 
relief efforts. Throughout the war Glazebrook reported the situation of the 
community to the American Embassy and never held back in appealing to the 
Embassy to intervene on behalf of the community when deemed necessary. On many 
occasions he appealed to local Ottoman authorities himself in the name of the 
community. At the beginning of the war, Morgenthau had expressed his gratitude to 
Glazebrook stating: 
I want to express to you my personal appreciation of the splendid work 
that you have been doing on behalf of the Jews and Jewish cause in 
Jerusalem. I feel very happy in receiving such hearty cooperation from 
you and in realizing that you are putting your full heart into the work.
117
 
 
Similarly, Arthur Ruppin had described Glazebrook as a decent man that was always 
ready to listen to the requests and complaints of the Jewish community and “do 
everything possible to help.”118 A Jerusalem based Hebrew newspaper had vividly 
explained what Glazebrook meant for the community: 
Dr. Glazebrook is a sincere friend of the Jews…In this time of universal 
butchery, when Europe has become a great hospital and lunatic asylum, 
America has proved to be the careful father of Palestine through the great 
work of Dr. Glazebrook. We are indeed fortunate to have on the spot a 
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man of such high quality and courage. We want our brethren in the States 
to know all this, to appreciate the same fully and to express it publicly. 
The Consul has under most trying circumstances, opened his heart and 
home to all of us, affording us abundant and fearless protection.
119
 
 
Upon returning to the United States, Glazebrook was honored by various American 
Jewish organizations for his “self-sacrifice and devotion” regarding the relief of the 
Jewish community of Palestine.
120
 Glazebrook’s work in Palestine was recognized 
and appreciated by all. 
 
4.1.3. Louis D. Brandeis 
 There is another name that must be mentioned when looking into the 
American involvement in Palestine during the Great War; Louis D. Brandeis. 
Brandeis, who was one of Wilson’s key advisors, was nominated by the President to 
the U.S. Supreme Court and consequently became an Associate Justice of the Court. 
As a Zionist leader, Brandeis was not only influential in generating sympathy among 
American leaders for the cause but also the American Jewish community. Melvin I. 
Urofsky asserts that Brandeis was effective in transferring American Zionism from a 
marginal movement to a mainstream one which subsequently meant more power 
politically and economically for Zionism.
121
 Until he was elected Associate Justice, 
Brandeis led the Provisional Executive Committee for General Zionist Affairs, which 
had embraced the mission of preventing the “economic breakdown of the new 
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settlement in Palestine.”122 Alongside immediate relief, the Committee provided 
Jewish institutions funds for their maintenance. Brandeis had also organized so relief 
could be sent to Palestine via American diplomatic channels.
123
 American Zionism 
took over the duty of supporting the Zionist enterprise from where European Zionism 
had left upon the outbreak of war.  
Brandeis directed American Zionism towards a neutral stance during the war. 
One of the reasons was that the United States was neutral for most of the war and 
even when it joined did not declare war on the Ottoman Empire. Another reason was 
because; as Morgenthau had explained the Ottomans were keeping “a close eye on 
American affairs.”124 American Zionists believed that contesting Ottoman rule over 
Palestine could result in the Ottomans taking a strong stance towards the Jewish 
community of Palestine, thus they chose to adopt neutrality. To make his position 
clear, Brandeis explained that: 
Zionism is not a movement to wrest from the Ottoman the sovereignty of 
Palestine. Zionism merely seeks to establish in Palestine, as part of the 
Turkish Empire, for such Jews as choose to go and remain there, and for 
their descendants, a legally secured home, where they may live together 
and lead a Jewish life.
125
 
 
Adopting neutrality was a smart move as Ottoman government officials and 
diplomatic representatives were indeed monitoring the American press and Zionist 
movement. When Morgenthau returned to the United States and made public 
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statements asserting that the Ottomans were willing to sell Palestine, the Porte was 
troubled. Ottoman diplomatic representatives were reporting his speeches and 
statements to Istanbul. The Ottoman Embassy in Bern advised the government to 
make a declaration with the Hahambaşı (Chief Rabbi) to end speculation over 
Morgenthau’s statement.126 Distressed by Morgenthau’s statement, the Ottoman 
government was compelled to publicly deny it.
127
 Although it was unlikely that any 
move or statement by American Zionists would have had an effect on the Ottoman 
government’s attitude towards its own subjects, it may have well forced the 
Ottomans to adopt a stricter attitude regarding the arrival of relief. Brandeis and 
American Zionism maintained neutrality for most part of the war which in return 
provided Ottoman cooperation in their relief efforts. Only in May 1917, after the 
United States had joined the war and seven months before the British invasion of 
Palestine, did the Provisional Executive Committee drop neutrality to support a 
British endorsed Jewish homeland in Palestine.
128
 However, the Committee 
continued to pursue policies in coherence with government policies. Even in August 
1918, almost a year after the British had seized Palestine, when Rabbi Stephen Wise 
wrote a letter to Wilson asking for support in favor of the Balfour Declaration, he 
underlined the fact that Zionism still did not challenge Ottoman suzerainty over 
Palestine as the United States was not at war with the Empire.
129
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4.2. Difficulties of the War 
 When World War I broke out in the summer of 1914, the official Ottoman 
reaction was a declaration of neutrality. However, as the Ottoman government had 
secretly signed an alliance treaty with the Germans, it had ordered general 
mobilization in the Empire. Even before the Empire had joined the war, the 
difficulties of war had encroached upon the Empire: the price of commodities had 
increased, fear of shortages had emerged, war profiteering had become widespread, 
and the situation of the treasury had turned critical.
130
 So, when the Ottomans joined 
the war in October 1914, it was far from prepared for a major military effort. 
 The situation of the Jewish community of Palestine was not any different; the 
economy of the community was crippled by the war. The majority of the community 
had lived off of halukah or other funds, which were sent from abroad to support the 
community.
131
 With the outbreak of the war, the flow of these funds, which mainly 
originated from belligerent countries, ceased.
132
 Moreover, the Empire had become 
economically isolated as navigation companies had suspended their services to and 
from Ottoman ports and the naval blockade imposed by the Allies had disrupted 
commercial relations with the outside world.
133
 For the Jewish community, this 
meant that they could not export their products, the two main products being wine 
and citrus.
134
 This was especially detrimental for the Jewish agricultural colonies that 
used to export their surplus and import petroleum, which was vital for the use of 
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irrigation pumps. So, shortly after the war had started, the Jewish community of 
Palestine was left without two of its main sources of income, accompanied by the 
uncertainty of the future. 
As panic-stricken people had rushed to the banks, the government was forced 
to declare a moratorium on payments and credit. Banks could no longer provide 
credit or sell gold to their customers.
135
 Eventually many banks had to close their 
doors which resulted in account holders losing access to their money.
136
 The 
restrictions on the operation of banks and their ultimate closing down were another 
setback for the Jewish community as banking was an integral part of their economic 
life. An American Jew living in Jaffa explained that during the war people had to 
“adjust” and that his business took on “Arabian clients whose custom is to keep their 
money with them and not at the Bank.”137 Alongside enduring the difficulties of 
trying to function under new circumstances, the community was left without its 
fundamental channels of which it communicated with international Jewry that was 
responsible for financing the Jewish colonization of Palestine.  
 The economic difficulties created by the war were naturally accompanied by 
a shortage of basic supplies and an increase in the price of commodities. The military 
requisition and conscription had created shortages all over the Empire. The region 
also suffered from widespread droughts and in addition, Palestine was plagued by 
hordes of locust in the summer of 1915, which would have disastrous effects on the 
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population of Palestine. Conde de Ballobar, the Spanish consul at Jerusalem had 
referred to the invasion of the locusts in his diary: 
Locusts! As I’m reading the Bible it serves as an illustration to see the 
millions and millions of little locusts that one sees everywhere in the 
country and in the city, and that will wind up leaving not a blade of grass 
in this country. The olive trees, the vineyards, the sown fields and the 
orchards, they have eaten everything and I ask myself what we will be 
able to eat this summer.
138
 
 
The locust plague had unfortunate effects on the Jewish agricultural colonies, in 
which some 15 000 Jews lived.
139
 To give an example the production of oranges fell 
from the usual two million cases to 200,000 cases due to the locust plague.
140
 The 
Ottoman authorities took various measures to fight the locust plague, including 
ordering men aged between nineteen and sixty to either collect kilos of locust or to 
pay a fine.
141
 However, it was not sufficient to prevent the destruction of many crops 
which consequently created a produce shortage that year. Due to the naval blockade, 
Palestine was not able to import to make up for the shortage and as the government 
had seized all means of transport, acquiring goods from other provinces was not 
always a possibility either.
142
 Three kilos of wheat, which cost a franc before the war, 
was sold for three francs during the war and that was if it could be found on the 
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market.
143
 The war combined with the calamity caused by the locust plague had 
created a shortage of food and an increase in food prices.  
 The natural consequence of shortages and the increase in prices was famine 
and disease. A great famine struck the Greater Syria region during the war years and 
diseases such as malaria, cholera and typhus became widespread.
144
 Rabbis were 
compelled to issue a call to the Jewish community in 1916, forbidding them to fast 
on Yom Kippur “on account of the prevalence of typhus in Palestine.”145 A young 
Ottoman soldier had vividly described the desperation that the war and nature had 
inflicted upon the people of Palestine in his diary (October 20, 1915): 
People are dying of hunger. All essential foodstuffs are missing, 
including material produced in other Ottoman provinces. Citizens can no 
longer bear this situation. A pound of flour costs 8 piasters. And this is 
from locally grown wheat. You can imagine the cost of buying imported 
sugar, where a pound of sugar costs 60 piasters (Jerusalem mint). Rice is 
30 piasters.
146
 
 
Almost two months later, he wrote: 
I haven’t seen darker days in my life. Flour and bread have basically 
disappeared since last Saturday. Many people have not eaten bread for 
days now…We have so far tolerated living without rice, sugar, and 
kerosene. But how can we live without bread?
147
 
 
The Jewish community, like the rest of the population of Greater Syria was exposed 
to famine and disease, which was effective throughout the war.  
                                                     
143
 Ballobar, Jerusalem in World War I, 106. 
144
 Salim Tamari, Year of the Locust: A Soldier’s Diary and the Erasure of Palestine’s Ottoman Past 
(Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 2011), 59. 
145
 “News from Palestine” The Maccabaean, XXIX, Sept, 1916, 66. 
146
 Tamari, Year of the Locust, 141. 
147
 Ibid, 142 – 143. 
51 
 
 The Jewish community also encountered problems that were not prevalent in 
the other communities of Palestine. As the majority of the Jewish community 
comprised of foreigners, with the abrogation of the capitulations, many were left 
without the foreign protection on which they so heavily relied. The entire Jewish 
community became subject to Ottoman laws. Foreign consulates could no longer act 
as mediators between the Jewish community and Ottoman authorities and the 
privileges many were accustomed to ceased to exist. Alexander Aaronsohn, a Jewish 
resident of Palestine and the brother of the famous British spy Aaron Aaronsohn, had 
considered the abrogation of the capitulations as “a terrible blow to all the 
Europeans” for it allowed “every boot-black or boatmen” to feel equal to the 
European, who now “had no consul to protect him.”148 As celebrations and 
demonstrations against Europeans had started to take place after the abrogation of the 
capitulations, Otis Glazebrook, the American Consul at Jerusalem, had asked 
Morgenthau to appeal to the Porte to cancel the parades and religious services on the 
anniversary of the coronation of Süleyman the Magnificent in fear of “excited local 
conditions and in view of the abrogation of the capitulations.”149 Whether there were 
valid reasons or not, the cancellation of the capitulations had created distress among 
foreigners. However, it was also welcomed by many among the Jewish 
community.
150
 Whatever the reactions may have been, the Jewish community had to 
function without the comfort of appealing to another power in its dealings with the 
Ottoman authorities. 
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 Another significant problem the Jewish community of Palestine had to deal 
with aroused right after the Ottoman Empire joined the war. As the Ottomans had 
entered the war on the side of the Central Powers, many of the Jews became 
belligerent nationals. Half of the 100,000 population of the Jewish community were 
Russian nationals, with many others being nationals of the other Allied countries.
151
 
Upon entering the war, the Ottoman government, in fear of unrest, had ordered all 
male subjects of belligerent countries to be expelled.
152
 Through the war, many 
foreign nationals residing in Palestine were in fact exiled internally or expelled from 
the Empire. So the Jewish community of Palestine faced losing a portion of its 
population right at the beginning of the war.  
 On the other hand, the Jews who were not foreign nationals but Ottoman 
subjects had problems of their own. Ottoman men between the ages of seventeen and 
forty were obliged to serve in the army during the war.
153
 However, non-Muslims 
could avoid serving in the army by paying an exemption tax (bedel-i askeri), for 
which many Jews opted. Glazebrook had reported to the American Embassy before 
the Ottomans had joined the war that the number of mobilized Jews was insignificant 
and that most had “purchased exemption” thereby had exhausted their resources.154 
Exemption was granted to those who were able to pay a sum of 1000 francs and that 
was not an amount that everyone could easily afford to pay.
155
 The exemption tax 
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contributed to the economic challenges the Jewish community experienced during 
the war. 
 One of the greatest challenges the Jewish community of Palestine faced 
during the war was the notorious Cemal Paşa. He was the Minister of the Navy and 
the commander of the Fourth Army based in Syria. He was one of the three men that 
ruled over the Empire during the war.  After being appointed governor of Syria, he 
was granted “full powers in military and civilian affairs” and “all cabinet decrees that 
pertained to Syria became subject to his approval.”156 Cemal Paşa was the sole ruler 
of Greater Syria. Falih Rıfkı Atay, a young Ottoman officer who served under Cemal 
Paşa during the war, wrote in his book Zeytindağı that in Palestine “the name Cemal 
seemed like a holy name from the Torah or Gospels.”157 When the military court 
sentenced to death less than a quarter of the twenty Arab nationalists, who were 
accused of treason in April, 1916, Cemal Paşa was not pleased with the verdict. So, 
he took the official verdict and wrote “sentenced to death” across all the names and 
thus overruled the court’s decision.158 Cemal Paşa defied all pleas from Istanbul 
asking for their release and less than a month later half of the men were hanged in 
Damascus and the other half in Beirut.
159
 Cemal Paşa felt no obligation to listen to 
the Porte or his comrades if he did not want to.  The Spanish consul noted an event in 
his diary in which the mutasarrif of Jerusalem could not implement an order from the 
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Porte for fear of Cemal Paşa.160 It is clear that Cemal Paşa had the final say in all 
matters in the Greater Syria region. 
 Cemal Paşa, like many Ottoman statesmen had witnessed separatist 
movements in the Balkans and knew exactly what the outcome meant for the Empire. 
Sharing the Ottoman state of mind, which was mentioned before, he too sought a 
unified and independent Ottoman Empire. He was dedicated to making sure that 
nothing similar to the nationalist movements of the Balkans would emerge in 
Palestine and Syria under his watch. He had no tolerance for the Arab and Jewish 
national aspirations that were bourgeoning at the time. The extent he went to curb 
such movements can be considered excessive. 
 During the war, Cemal Paşa marked his place in the memory of all the 
communities of Palestine and Syria. Remembered by his ruthless governorship of the 
Arab provinces of the Empire, he began to symbolize the tragic era of the war in the 
region. He was described as an intelligent and hard-working man; however, it was 
his rigor that made him stand out.
161
  He regarded mercy as a weakness and abhorred 
complaining.
162
 He had once stated that: “I have never complained in my life. I do 
like being complained about.”163 The brutality associated with Cemal Paşa had 
generated tales about him across the region; Atay gives an example of one of these 
tales in his book: 
In Syria they used to say, when speaking to someone, if Cemal Paşa 
scratched his nose, he was thinking of sending them to exile; if he 
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stroked his beard, he was thinking of whether or not to forgive them. 
However, if he twirled his moustache, be afraid for the conversation was 
on a path that may lead to death.
164
 
 
The fate of the people of Greater Syria was left in the hands of a man of such 
character.  
 So when the war broke out, the Jewish community of Palestine was amidst a 
sea of uncertainty. The traditional way of life had been destroyed by the war. The 
economy of the community was deteriorating with the loss of two of its main income 
sources. As the war and natural disasters had created a shortage of food, the 
community also faced the danger of famine and disease. In addition to these 
challenges, the majority of the community was left without the foreign protection, 
which they had benefitted from for so long in their dealings with Ottoman 
authorities. Similarly, the community could not turn to the Porte as the local 
authorities did not always conform to the decisions made in Istanbul. The community 
was forced to endure the hardships of the war as well as adapt to the momentous 
changes occurring in the region.  
 The war years in Ottoman Palestine seemed unfavorable for the Jewish 
community for the many reasons stated above. The war could have easily constituted 
a breaking point for the community as all odds seemed against it. Nevertheless, at 
such a critical point in time, the community managed to survive and the Jewish 
colonization of Palestine continued with minor setbacks. The community went on to 
expand and consolidate its status in Palestine during the British mandate, which was 
created after the Ottomans left the region. The greatest factor that contributed to the 
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community’s survival was the American protection and assistance to the community. 
Other contributing factors include but are not limited to Germany, the Porte and the 
shifting tides of the political sphere in Palestine and the region during the war.  The 
American part played in protecting and assisting the community, which is the focus 
point of this thesis, will be discussed in the next subchapter. How did the American 
foreign missions in the Empire help the community? What channels did they use? 
How did they benefit from the United States’ good relations with the Porte?  
 
4.3. Surviving the War 
 The outbreak of World War I had immediate effects on the Jewish 
community of Palestine, as mentioned before. Within the first weeks of the war, the 
flow of funds to Palestine ceased. When this was accompanied by the disruption of 
imports and exports, the leaders of the Jewish community sought to alleviate the 
effects of the war. Calls for help were sent out in all directions and one call in 
particular received a response; the call to the American ambassador in Istanbul, 
Henry Morgenthau.
165
 Morgenthau, who had visited Palestine in April, 1914, was 
familiar with the Jewish community and the region. In fact, it is believed that he was 
responsible for the suspension of the Jaffa based anti-Zionist newspaper Filastin,
166
 
which was shut down by the Ottoman authorities a month after Morgenthau’s visit.167 
Upon receiving the community’s plea in August 1914, Morgenthau conveyed it to 
Jacob Schiff, who was an influential member of the Jewish community in the United 
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States, stating that the “thriving colonies” were threatened by destruction.168 Schiff 
replied by promising Morgenthau to remit the $50 000, which the ambassador had 
asked.
169
 Morgenthau then appointed his son-in-law to travel to Palestine on board 
the American cruiser North Carolina to distribute the funds, which reached Jaffa port 
in early October.
170
 The Maccabaean, an American Jewish periodical, had reported 
the deliverance of the relief funds: 
Not only has the money served to give food to thousands of hungry 
people; the fact that it was brought here by Mr. Morgenthau’s son-in-law, 
Mr. Wertheim, on board an American cruiser, has also proved to the non-
Jewish population that the Jewish community, although small in 
numbers, is strongly assisted by the huge masses of Jews in other parts of 
the world. The spectacle of Mr. Wertheim escorted by the leader of the 
Zionist Palestine Bureau and followed by sailors carrying the sacks of 
money to the safe-rooms of the Anglo Palestine Company, created a 
sensation among the Arabs and inspired the Jews with fresh hopes and 
confidence.
171
 
 
The distribution of the funds was carried out by notable Zionists such as Arthur 
Ruppin and Aaron Aaronsohn and was presided over by the American consul in 
Jerusalem, Otis Glazebrook. The relief fund ameliorated the conditions of the Jewish 
community and made it possible for people to equip themselves with food supplies 
and medicine to prepare for the difficult times ahead.
172
 Maurice Wertheim also 
made arrangements with Ottoman authorities in the provinces to protect the Jewish 
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community’s food depots and inventories from possible confiscation.173 Before the 
Ottoman Empire had joined the war, American efforts had ensured the community 
with funds that would be sufficient for a period of time and had also provided 
political leverage, exhibiting that the community could exert influence when 
required. This was the first of many occasions, in which the American diplomatic 
mission in the Ottoman Empire would step up to help the Jewish community during 
the war. 
 The next major crisis for the Jewish community of Palestine emerged after 
the Ottoman Empire joined the war. As the Ottomans had ordered the expulsion of 
all male subjects of belligerent countries, the community needed a miracle to avert 
the expulsion of its many members that fell under the category. That miracle was 
delivered by Morgenthau, whose appeals in Istanbul persuaded the Ottoman 
government to allow foreign Jews to stay in Palestine by obtaining Ottoman 
citizenship.
174
 Ottomanization committees were immediately established to ease the 
process for foreign nationals, who opted to go through with naturalization. Leaders 
of the community such as David Ben-Gurion (who went on to become Israel’s first 
prime minister), Yitzhak Ben-Zvi and the hahambaşı (Grand Rabbi) of Palestine 
Moshe Franko supported the process.
175
 Some foreign Jews, who wanted to become 
Ottoman citizens, could not afford to pay the required fee and expected a time 
extension from the Ottoman government in order to gather the money from the 
United States and Europe but by December 1914, Morgenthau reported that the Porte 
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had agreed to waive the naturalization fee for all indignant Jews.
 176
 Additionally 
those who became Ottoman citizens were to be exempt from military service and all 
government taxes for a year.
177
 However, despite the incentives, many foreign Jews 
refrained from taking on Ottoman citizenship; some due to the traditional reasons 
mentioned before and some due to conditions that had recently emerged. As citizens 
of Allied powers, many feared of being held accountable for treason by the laws of 
their country once the Allies won the war.
178
 On the other hand many Russian Jews, 
who had capital invested and families living in Russia, could not risk violating 
Russian laws therefore declined to renounce their Russian citizenship to take on 
Ottoman citizenship.
179
 Although many foreign Jews had become Ottomans, the 
majority of them did not go through with the process.
180
 
 On December 17, the expulsion of all Jews who were belligerent nationals 
was ordered; hundreds were immediately expelled.
181
 Although the order targeted all 
belligerent nationals, the expulsions that were carried out centered on Russian 
Jews.
182
 Upon receiving the news, Glazebrook appealed to Cemal Paşa for the delay 
of the expulsions in order to gain time for those who wanted to but had not yet 
become Ottoman citizens.
183
 On the other hand, Morgenthau and his German 
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counterpart in Istanbul sought to end the expulsions altogether.
184
 As a result of the 
American and German diplomatic pressure in Istanbul, the expulsions were put on 
hold by the end of December.
185
 They also managed to get the Porte to remove 
Bahattin Bey, the notorious anti-Zionist kaymakam of Jaffa, from his post.
186
  
 The Jewish community was relieved for the time being; however, it was clear 
that the situation of foreign Jews was not going to be resolved any time soon. The 
expulsions prompted many foreign Jews to take on Ottoman citizenship, while many 
others chose to leave Palestine voluntarily.
187
 This led to the creation of Jewish exile 
communities in Egypt, which would be effective in aiding the British propaganda 
machine throughout the war.
188
 American cruisers made numerous trips to and from 
Jaffa to transfer Jews who were to leave Palestine.
189
  
 The next major crisis for the Jewish community began with the arrival of 
Cemal Paşa in Palestine. Upon his arrival, Cemal Paşa made a declaration to the 
people of Palestine stating that: 
…The people of the land of Palestine are responsible for the duties of 
defending the homeland and holy war more than anywhere else. One of 
these duties is the continuation of harmony, without any occasion that 
could disrupt the important and sincere bond between all Ottoman 
elements. Any minor motion that could violate this bond will be severely 
punished. Therefore, I request Muslims, who constitute the majority, to 
treat Jews and Christians with utmost gentleness and friendly feelings. 
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 Dwellers of allied, friendly and neutral countries in the land of Palestine 
are our valuable guests. At this point in time when we are giving a battle 
of life and death, it is necessary to treat them better than ever. During 
these serious and difficult times our moral values will become apparent 
and as increasing the friendship and fondness of foreign elements 
towards us is a necessity of our national interests, we can only achieve 
that in this fashion. 
 The life, property, honor, and order, including the personal rights of 
subjects of enemy countries is under the guarantee of our nation. 
Therefore, I will not allow even the smallest assault against them…190 
 
Cemal Paşa seemed determined to prevent social unrest in Palestine. Cemal Paşa’s 
arrival accompanied by his proclamation to protect the Jewish community would 
have been considered a beneficial development for the community, if he had left it at 
that. But the actions of Muslims, who were now unfettered by the capitulations, were 
not his only concern: Cemal Paşa was also determined to crush any nationalist 
movement that would lead to more than social unrest. Cemal Paşa regarded Zionism 
as a movement that was “very obnoxious to the interests of the Turkish state” and 
with the assistance of his newly appointed political advisor Bahattin Bey, was 
determined to eradicate it once and for all.
191
  Shortly after his arrival, he summoned 
up notable Zionists and ordered their exile into the interior. This was followed by the 
arrest of many other Zionists. Next, the use of Zionist symbols was prohibited and 
finally the Anglo-Palestine Bank was shut down.
192
 The Jewish community once 
again, in need of help turned to Morgenthau and once again Morgenthau and his 
German counterpart in Istanbul promised to help the community.
193
 Together the two 
pressured the Porte for the rectification of the developments in Palestine. 
                                                     
190
 Öke, Kutsal Topraklarda Siyonistler ve Masonlar, 344 – 345. 
191
The Zionist Review, May, 1918, Morgenthau Papers, LOC, Container 35. 
192
 Ruppin, Arthur Ruppin, 154. 
193
 Friedman, Germany, Turkey and Zionism, 220. 
62 
 
Morgenthau protested before the Porte and even after he found Talat Paşa, the 
Minister of the Interior, willing to comply with his demands, he did not settle there 
and went all the way up to Enver Paşa.194  Also in compliance with Morgenthau’s 
demands, Enver Paşa sent a cable to Palestine demanding proper treatment for the 
Jews of Palestine.
195
 As Cemal Paşa was receiving bad news from the front and as 
the Arab nationalist movement was gaining momentum, he did not have much choice 
but to succumb to the demands of Istanbul and shortly after the Anglo-Palestine 
Bank was reopened; Bahattin Bey, once again was removed from his post and most 
of the Zionist detainees were released.
196
 Additionally, the Porte had ordered the 
authorities in Palestine to refrain from “oppressive measures against the Jews.”197 
Going further, Cemal Paşa made public visits to Jewish facilities expressing his 
goodwill to the Jewish people and promising them protection.
198
 American and 
German diplomatic intervention managed to prevent Cemal Paşa from executing 
measures that could have been detrimental for the Jewish community and devastating 
for the Zionist enterprise. The extent Cemal Paşa went to curb Arab nationalist 
aspirations, which was advancing simultaneously with Zionism, demonstrated that 
without any holdback Cemal Paşa was capable of great destruction. 
 All the commotion of January and February 1915 caused great concern across 
the western world regarding the situation of the Jewish community of Palestine. 
Distorted information on the war in the Near East, which was being distributed by 
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the British to the international press, only aggravated the situation.
199
 While the 
Ottomans kept their area of interest limited to Zionists and Zionism, which it 
acknowledged as a separatist movement; this was not of any value for the British. 
The British instead chose to portray anti-Zionist measures as a prelude to the 
destruction of the entire Jewish community. As the United States had traditionally 
been concerned with the well-being of the Jewish and Christian subjects of the 
Ottoman Empire, many Americans were rightfully worried for the fate of the Jewish 
community. Thus, the vast amount of stories emerging in the press and the pleas of 
American Jewish leaders compelled the State Department to look into the matter. 
Captain Decker of the U.S.S. Tennessee, which was in the region travelling between 
Jaffa and Alexandria, was appointed for the job. After consulting Jewish leaders and 
American diplomats in Alexandria and Palestine, he concluded that “the sentiment of 
the people in Syria and Palestine is very strong against Jews” and that Zionism was 
in danger.
200
 Captain Decker had reached this conclusion, not because the Jewish 
community was actually under threat but because he assumed the Jewish and 
Christian communities would be so if the Ottoman Suez offensive failed.
201
 Based on 
Decker’s report, the State Department cabled Morgenthau on February 18, stating: 
You are instructed to attempt to secure from Turkish Government order 
to civil and military officials throughout Palestine and Syria that they will 
be held responsible for lives and property of Jews and Christians in case 
of massacre or looting.
202
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Upon consulting Talat Paşa, Morgenthau responded transmitting Talat Paşa’s 
message that there was “no reason for apprehension” and that Jews and Christians 
were “properly protected.”203 Morgenthau did not leave it at that and in compliance 
with the State Department’s instructions, he also requested the Porte to send 
instructions to the authorities in Palestine. The Porte did indeed send instructions to 
provincial officials ordering them to protect “all innocent people” from molestation 
and warned that any official that disobeyed orders would be punished.
204
 Morgenthau 
must have been satisfied with his efforts before the Porte as he reported back to 
Washington declaring that “we have succeeded in suspending movement against 
Zionism.”205 Whether there actually was any immediate danger threatening the 
Jewish community or not, the United States government took the necessary measures 
within its power to secure the welfare of the community which it perceived to be 
under threat.  
 As the conditions in Palestine deteriorated due to the war, American Jewish 
organizations hastened their relief efforts. When the American Jewish Relief 
Committee could not find commercial ships to carry supplies, Josephus Daniels, the 
Secretary of the Navy, suggested that they be transferred on a Navy collier.
206
 Next, 
negotiations were made for the passage of a relief ship through the Allied blockade 
of Ottoman ports.
207
 The American Jewish Relief Committee, the Central Relief 
Committee and the Provisional Executive Committee for General Zionist Affairs sent 
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a shipment of food, medicine and clothing to Palestine in March on the U.S.S. 
Vulcan.  The United States government had obtained permission from the Sublime 
Porte for the safe landing of the goods and the Porte also waived import duties on the 
condition that the distribution took place under the supervision of the municipality.
208
 
The food delivery was intended for the entire population of Palestine: the Jewish 
community received fifty-five percent of the products, the Muslim community 
received 26 percent and the Christian community received 19 percent.
209
 The 
majority of the food supply comprised of flour with smaller amounts of sugar, rice, 
coffee and tea.
210
 Most of the portion that was for the Jewish community was allotted 
for Jerusalem, of which twenty-three thousand people and thirty-five institutions 
benefitted from.
211
 The shipment immediately ameliorated the condition of the 
Jewish community and that of Palestine, as the price of food began to go down.
212
 
All this was possible due to the United States government, which made use of all 
means to organize and execute the difficult task of delivering supplies beyond a 
military blockade and doing so by acquiring the consent of two warring parties. 
 American ships continued their trips to and from Ottoman ports, transferring 
Jews who were to leave Palestine. As subjects of hostile nations were required to 
leave the Empire, Jews who had failed to adopt Ottoman citizenship despite the time 
extension were obligated to leave Palestine. The American consuls in the region were 
undertaking extra work to obtain permission from local authorities for their 
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departure, while American vessels were going out of their way to secure the 
transportation of the refugees. Morgenthau had once again used his influence in 
Istanbul to obtain permission for American vessels to enter Ottoman ports, which had 
been declared closed to neutral navigation.
213
 As Morgenthau and his staff had 
organized the logistics of the departure of Jewish and other refugees, he had reported 
back to Washington on the services of American cruisers that: 
The use of our cruisers for this purpose has meant much extra work and 
inconvenience for their officers and crews. But they have satisfied an 
urgent need, and in their ready and gracious help to those in anxiety and 
distress will long be remembered by their grateful beneficiaries.
214
 
 
Morgenthau was also responsible for obtaining permission for the landing of the 
refugees in Alexandria, Egypt which at times was challenging.
215
 The coordination of 
all these factors was troublesome and was not always successful. Occasions in which 
passengers failed to embark because the arrival date of the cruiser was unknown or 
incidents in which cruisers were left without passengers because permission for their 
departure had not been obtained was not uncommon. Overall, American diplomatic 
agencies in the Ottoman Empire had done everything possible to keep Jews, who 
were foreign nationals in Palestine and when they did not succeed, they organized 
and secured their safe exit.  
The frequent trips made by American ships also ensured the continuation of 
funds sent from the United States to Palestine which was crucial for the survival of 
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the Jewish community. When the Ottoman authorities objected to the transfer of 
funds on grounds that it gave the Jewish community an advantage over the Arab 
community and because they believed it could be used for purposes other than relief, 
Morgenthau managed to persuade the Ottomans to settle the matter favorably.
216
 
However, by the end of 1915, the British prohibited remittances from Egypt to the 
Ottoman Empire which had grave effects on the community and Palestine in 
general.
217
 The amount of gold in Palestine decreased and caused the Ottomans to 
transfer their own gold reserves to the capital which subsequently caused paper 
money to lose value.
218
 This naturally brought about an increase in food prices. 
Nevertheless, the most troublesome outcome for the community was the suspension 
of funds via the Mediterranean. In January, 1916 Ruppin contacted Morgenthau 
describing the situation of the community: 
 
Although I am always trying not to exaggerate in depicting the situation, 
still I must tell you that the misery of our Jewish population has reached 
a most fearful degree in the last months. A large part of them is no longer 
able to procure the necessary means of subsistence and as a consequence 
cases of illness and death from underfeeding and starvation occur now in 
numbers which were unseen up till now and they show a constant 
increase.
219
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He concluded by requesting Morgenthau to ensure the continuation of relief sent 
from the United States.
220
 Morgenthau was compelled to send money by mail from 
Istanbul, which Manuel explains: 
This became the set method for the dispatch of moneys to Palestine 
during the next eighteen months. From then on there were regular orders 
to Morgenthau from the United States to make remittances to Glazebrook 
for the Zionists and for general relief…By March, 1916 the Jewish 
organizations in the United States had put relief remittances on a definite 
monthly basis.
 221
 
 
Even though this method was inconvenient as only paper money could be sent, in 
comparison with the gold bullions that were being shipped into Palestine beforehand, 
it was a solution and it did ensure the continuance of funds for the Jewish 
community.  
 As famine and disease swept through the Greater Syria region, American 
Jewish organizations concentrated their efforts on delivering medical supplies to the 
Jewish community of Palestine. In February 1916, an American cruiser loaded with 
87 cases of medical supplies valued at $18 000 set sail for Palestine.
222
 There were 
many obstacles that stood in the way of this relief mission. England and France were 
not willing to allow any ship through their naval blockade in the Eastern 
Mediterranean, while on the other hand, the cruiser needed permission from the 
Ottoman authorities to enter and unload in Ottoman ports. In early 1916, Morgenthau 
had resigned as ambassador and left Istanbul to assist Wilson in his reelection 
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campaign and thus was no longer available to use his ways to influence the Porte’s 
decisions. As the supplies were stored in Alexandria, the situation was put on hold 
till Morgenthau’s successor, Abram Elkus, took over in October 1916. Elkus, who 
was also dedicated to assisting the Jewish community of Palestine, seized the 
opportunity to meet up with Cemal Paşa during his visit to Istanbul. He managed to 
get Cemal Paşa’s consent for the American cruiser Des Moines to unload the medical 
supplies at Jaffa and to have them transferred to Jerusalem by train.
223
 When it came 
to persuading the English and French governments for the passage of the cruiser, 
Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, asked the American ambassadors in London and 
Paris to find out whether the British and French governments would relinquish the 
blockade for the passage of the American cruiser. When both governments declined, 
Lansing persisted in his demand which resulted in the French government agreeing 
to allow the cruiser to pass through under conditions to be formulated by the Admiral 
in command of the blockading squadron.
224
 However, the supplies never reached 
Ottoman Palestine. First, the trip was delayed because of extended correspondence 
between the United States and the Central Powers regarding the safe passage of the 
ships: Austrian pledge guaranteeing the safety of the ships was not obtained on 
time.
225
 Then, authorization was not permitted for American citizens who were to 
leave Palestine on the cruiser delivering the medical supplies. The cruiser was 
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interned at Alexandria waiting for permission to be granted.
226
 Shortly after the 
United States joined the war on the side of the Allies, which made it impossible to 
deliver the supplies to the Ottoman Empire. Only after Palestine fell under British 
occupation in December, 1917, did the supplies reach Palestine. It took almost two 
years for the medical supplies to reach Palestine but American officials on all levels 
had pushed for its actualization throughout its long journey. 
 On April 20, 1917, the Ottoman Empire severed its relations with the United 
States. Abram Elkus, left Istanbul as Otis Glazebrook left Jerusalem shortly after. 
The representation of American interests was transferred to the Swedish legation in 
Istanbul and the Spanish legation in Jerusalem. The Jewish community had lost its 
greatest protector and supporter. Financially not all was bad since, before the rupture 
of relations, Elkus had obtained permission from Cavid Bey, the Minister of Finance, 
and Talat Paşa to send enough gold to Palestine that would be sufficient for a couple 
of months.
227
 Additionally, American relief continued to reach Palestine even after 
the break of relations.
228
 The task of distributing relief was assigned to the Spanish 
consul and continued this way till the British invasion.
229
 The rupture of relations did 
not end the United States’ diplomatic involvement with the community. The 
American Jewish community and the American government continued to follow the 
developments in the region. When the news of the evacuation of Jaffa reached 
American Jewry in the middle of May, which was again distributed by the British 
and Nili (pro-British Jewish espionage ring) to the international community, it was 
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portrayed as an anti-Jewish measure, of which there was more to come. Acting upon 
the news, Louis Marshall, the president of the American Jewish Committee, appealed 
to the Secretary of State requesting the intervention of neutral countries.
230
 The 
American government appealed to neutral countries to look into the events and offer 
their assistance if required. The Swedish and Norwegian governments replied 
explaining that there was no situation that required protection for the Jewish 
community.
231
 When Elkus was asked to comment on the news of the persecution of 
the Jewish community, he stated that “the reports received in this country of 
wholesale massacre and maltreatment of the Jews in Turkey and Palestine were 
entirely unfounded.” He added that the situation of the Jewish community was “as 
favorable as could be expected.”232 Similarly, Glazebrook stated that the news of 
massacre and persecution were “much exaggerated” and that Ottoman authorities 
“were disposed to treat the Jews as fairly and kindly as circumstances permitted.”233 
The United States, for one last time had sought to protect the Jewish community of 
Ottoman Palestine, which it thought may have been in danger.  
 In December, 1917, Jerusalem fell to the British forces and Ottoman Palestine 
ceased to exist. Palestine was now under the control of an American ally. A new era 
had started in the relationship between the United States and the Holy Lands, one 
that did not pass through Istanbul. Jewish refugees who had left during the war 
returned and the British Mandate, which was established shortly after the end of the 
war, opened new doors to the community.  
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 Traditionally, the United States had been interested in the Christian and 
Jewish subjects of the Ottoman Empire. American assistance to the community 
during the war can be considered a continuation of this interest. Through the war, the 
United States was also involved with the Armenian community and the Christian 
communities of the Levant. Although the United States had occasionally intervened 
on behalf of the Christian and Jewish communities before the war, during the war it 
formulated and executed stronger policies. Alongside the humanitarian aspect, 
carrying out such policies fit in well with the United States’ desire to assume a 
greater presence on the international platform which was consolidated through the 
war. American Jewry was also effective on the shaping of American policy. 
American Jewry had become a well-organized and powerful group by the beginning 
of the twentieth century. In response to the anti-Jewish policies of the Russian 
Empire, in 1911, American Jewry had pressured and succeeded in getting President 
William Howard Taft to abrogate the American-Russian treaty of 1832. American 
Jewry had the ability to influence American foreign policy and during the war did so 
in favor of the community. An article published during the war, in the Maccabaean, 
had discussed the possibility of the United States becoming involved in the solution 
of “the Jewish problem in Palestine” and believed it was possible, because: 
Under present conditions, the relations of the United States and Turkey 
are such as to make possible an amicable arrangement by which such an 
interest could be exercised. The traditional friendship between the 
Ottomans and the United States, and the traditional good-will shown to 
the Jewish people by the Ottoman government and its people present 
conditions favorable to the participation of the United States on behalf of 
Jewish interests in Palestine.
234
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This was a clear demonstration that the community was satisfied with the 
government’s efforts and aware of the good relations between the United States and 
the Ottoman Empire, which led many American Jews to expect the United Stated to 
assume a greater political role regarding the Jewish Question and Palestine. Beside 
all the political and humanitarian reasons the United States helped the community, 
the fact that the United States had no vital interest in the region made it all the more 
possible for the United States to act as it did. The United States refused to endorse 
any movement or action that would jeopardize the status quo in Ottoman-American 
relations or its business interests in the Empire but provided all services as long as it 
did not. 
 German assistance and protection of the Jewish community was another 
determining factor in fate of the community. The subject is examined in detail in the 
third chapter of Friedman’s Germany, Turkey, Zionism: 1897 – 1918. On many 
occasions, Morgenthau combined forces with his German counterpart, Hans von 
Wangenheim, while dealing with the Porte. Nevertheless, Germany was the Ottoman 
Empire’s ally and could not afford to antagonize the Porte; German officials made it 
clear that although they were sympathetic to Zionism, they could not interfere in the 
internal affairs of the Empire.
235
 There was also the fact that the growing German 
penetration into the Empire had turned many Ottoman officials reluctant to comply 
with German requests. Friedman puts forward that Cemal Paşa resented German 
influence and “denied their consuls the right to interfere” and that he did not hesitate 
to underline that the capitulatory system was abolished.
236
 German officials turned to 
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continually underlining the importance of international Jewry and how maintaining 
good relations with them would be beneficial for their common cause. However, the 
Germans managed to convince the Ottomans to adopt a pro-Zionist attitude only 
after Palestine fell to the British.
237
 
 As demonstrated in this chapter, American assistance to the Jewish 
community through the war was incessant and immense. The financial aspect of it 
was decisive on the fate of the community. During the war, over $ 2,000,000 was 
raised in the United States and delivered to Palestine.
238
 Glazebrook had reported that 
out of the 82 000 population of the Jewish community of Palestine, only 18 000 
managed to maintain themselves without applying for relief sent from the United 
States.
239
 The funds sent from the United States were used for various purposes. 
Generally the funds were used to purchase food for the needy which were distributed 
either free of charge or at reduced prices. Weekly financial support and grants based 
on need were also prevalent. The funds were also pivotal in the maintenance of 
institutions in Palestine. Schools, hospitals, orphanages, retirement homes, soup 
kitchens, and many other institutions continued to operate because of the financial 
support sent from the United States.
240
 The funds not only fed the poor and assisted 
the needy; they also ensured the continuation of the Zionist enterprise. Although 
Zionist notables often denied it in the presence of Ottoman officials, the Zionist 
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enterprise did continue to function as a semi-autonomous entity with its population, 
institutions, and government-like network.  
 The diplomatic aspect of the American assistance was just as significant as 
the financial aspect. The abrogation of the capitulations was followed by the closure 
of the consulates that had traditionally undertaken the duty of protecting the Jewish 
community. The majority of the Jewish community should have left the Empire as 
they were nationals of enemy countries but Morgenthau managed to annul the 
deportation order and work out a solution that would keep the foreign Jews in 
Palestine. Regarding the small portion of the population that was forced to leave 
Palestine, Morgenthau commented that they suffered from their own choice.
241
 Even 
the Jews who refused to become Ottoman citizens and were forced to leave were 
provided with living expenses by the Ottoman authorities, which Stanford J. Shaw 
explains as a “more favorable treatment than that provided for Christians in the same 
situation, who were simply deported without any assistance whatsoever.”242 The 
American influence on the Ottoman Empire’s dealings with the community was 
visible. Furthermore, American influence was revealed from the documents whereby 
Ottoman officials in Palestine requested through the American consulate for 
Morgenthau to intervene on local matters.
243
 The work of the American diplomatic 
agencies in the Empire combined with that of the Department of State’s, safeguarded 
the community and its interests. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 The Spanish consul Ballobar in his diary vividly described the entrance of the 
British forces into Jerusalem on December 9, 1917: 
I have never seen a popular enthusiasm so spontaneous and great. Every 
British soldier that passed by was followed and escorted by a throng of 
admirers that touched his uniform, caressed his horse, talked to him in all 
the languages of the Orient and admired him like a hero. In this 
admiration were men and women, small and large, Christians and Jews. 
Through the streets there circled an enormous multitude, overwhelmed 
by a limitless satisfaction and understandable and excusable 
enthusiasm.
244
 
 
The British were indeed credited as the heroes who saved the Jewish community of 
Palestine. Not just in 1917 but also in the years that followed. The Balfour 
Declaration and the British Mandate established after the end of the war played a big 
part in the creation of this sentiment. Through World War I, the British adopted pro-
Zionist policies which resulted in the promise of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. The 
Zionist aspect of the war outshined the situation of the Jewish community of 
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Palestine. Therefore the crucial contribution the United States made to the 
community has not received the attention it deserves. The United States did not 
support or disapprove of political Zionism during the war; it remained rather 
indifferent to the movement. At the time when the British and Germans were 
engaged in another conflict of trying to take Zionism under their own wing, the 
United States did nothing of the kind. However, what the United States did was 
provide assistance and protection to the Jewish community of Palestine. Although it 
is overlooked, without a significant Jewish community it would have been 
impossible for Britain to implement its policies concerning Zionism. Of course, the 
United States never was concerned with the political aspect of Zionism and offered 
help to the community in accordance with its traditional policy of caring for the 
Jewish and Christian communities of the Ottoman Empire, as it was simultaneously 
assisting Christian communities within the Empire. Of course, the role played by 
American Jewry was just as important in the United States’ involvement. Britain may 
have been the savior of Zionism but it was the United States that was the savior of 
the Jewish community of Palestine during the war as it ensured the survival of the 
community. 
 This thesis attempted to deal with just how the United States assisted and 
protected the Jewish community of Palestine during the Great War. The main reason 
it could was due to the good relations between the United States and the Ottoman 
Empire. Without it the United States could not have provided financial or diplomatic 
assistance. As explained in chapter four, the Ottoman authorities almost always 
complied with American requests on behalf of the Jewish community. Since the 
United States depended on Ottoman cooperation in all fields relating to deliverance 
78 
 
of aid and assistance, the significance of cordial relations between the two states is a 
factor that cannot be overlooked. The United States on the other hand, respected 
Ottoman territorial integrity and sovereignty through the war. American Zionists 
were also careful not to attract unnecessary attention and avoided creating tension for 
the most part.  
 The financial aspect of American assistance was immense and reached the 
majority of the Jewish population of Palestine. With the war, the Jewish community 
was left without its main income sources and burdened by the difficulties of the war. 
Not only did American funds directly save lives but they also allowed vital 
institutions such as schools, hospitals and orphanages to continue functioning. 
Moreover, American funds continued through the war and provided economic 
stability for the community.  
 Through the war, the Jewish community turned to American diplomatic 
agencies in the Empire for help. Either Jewish leaders appealed to the consulates or 
sent a message to the Embassy in Istanbul via the consulates. The consuls or 
ambassadors would take it up with Ottoman authorities and try to find a solution for 
the community’s problem. This is similar if not identical to the arrangement that 
existed under the capitulatory system. Considering the Ottoman view on 
capitulations, we can attribute its tolerance by the Ottomans to the fact that the 
Ottomans did not feel that the United States was abusing it and also to the fact that 
the United States did not request anything that was contrary to Ottoman interests.  
79 
 
 Cemal Paşa, who had a hostile attitude towards Zionism, never took grave 
steps towards the movement.
245
 This is interesting considering his firm stance against 
Arab nationalist movements in the region. Hasan Kayalı asserts that during the war, 
Cemal Paşa “instituted a reign of terror in Syria against Arab opponents.”246 He 
deported some 5,000 Syrian families to Anatolia, alongside executing many Arab 
notables.
247
 Although Cemal Paşa attempted to crack down on Zionism, many of his 
measures were overruled due to American and to a smaller extent German 
intervention. As demonstrated in chapter four, Morgenthau managed to persuade the 
Porte to rectify anti-Zionist measures on several occasions. The discrepancy 
regarding Cemal Paşa’s treatment of the two nationalist movements, Arab and 
Jewish, is a clear indication of the impact the United States had on the fate of the 
Jewish community. 
 When the war broke out in 1914, the future of the Jewish community of 
Palestine was uncertain. As no one could have assumed the British would have 
invaded Palestine by 1917 and established a mandate shortly after, everything the 
United States done on behalf of the community during the war was significant. Even 
if the outcome of the war had been different in the Middle East, the fact that the 
United States convinced the Ottomans to allow the majority of the Jewish 
community who were foreign nationals to stay within Palestine, would still have 
allowed the dream of a Jewish homeland, under Ottoman sovereignty or not, to 
continue. Overall, the United States concentrated on the needs of the Jewish 
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community of Palestine and did all it could to assist and protect the community 
through the war. To do this the United States made use of its friendly relations with 
the Ottoman Empire. All efforts resulted with the survival of the Jewish community 
with minor injuries. 
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